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Abstract
We propose a model with segmented markets that delivers endogenous variations in term
spreads driven by banks’ portfolio decisions while facing maturity risk. Future profitability
influences the term premium banks require to carry this risk. When expected profitability is
relatively high (low) spreads are low (high). Spread fluctuations feed back into the macroe-
conomy through investment decisions. Econometric evidence corroborates this link between
expected financial profitability and yield spreads. Finally, we analyse unconventional mone-
tary policy by allowing banks to sell assets to the central bank. These interventions exploit a
new channel of policy transmission through banks’ portfolio choice aecting the yield curve.
The presence of term spreads, or alternatively term premia, has implications on financial transac-
tions, macroeconomic outcomes and policy design. The existing literature finds that the slope of
the yield curve has significant predictive power in explaining US business cycle fluctuations (see,
for instance, Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) or more recently Rudebusch and Williams (2009)).
This predictive power stems from the relation between the slope of the yield curve and the fu-
ture path of short-term interest rates, and also, from variations in term spreads. While there is
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le a growing literature on term spreads and macroeconomic outcomes, there is little consensus onthe determinants of time varying term premia. Moreover, recent large scale purchase programmesadopted by the Federal Reserve Bank, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank had
a significant impact on the shape of the yield curve, increasing the importance of understanding
and modelling those variations. In this paper, we propose a theoretical model with segmented
markets that provides an explanation for endogenous variations in term spreads driven primarily
by changes in banks’ balance sheets, their expected profitability and their appetite to bear the risk
of maturity transformation.
Early structural models that look at the term structure of interest rates rely on the expectations
hypothesis; thereby limit the analysis to cases of constant risk premium. There is evidence, ho-
wever, that the term premium is time varying (see for instance Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) and
references therein). Consequently, macro-finance models focus on the variability of the stochastic
discount factor and its links to macroeconomic variables. The literature is extensive. For instance,
recent work by Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) and by Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) model risk
premium as an outcome of the negative covariance between inflation and consumption growth. In
this framework financial investors demand a higher risk premium as a hedge against (long-term)
inflation risk.1
Although supporting the view that long run inflation risk is an important determinant of term
spread fluctuations, three main empirical findings motivate the search for additional factors ex-
ternal to monetary policy. First, as stressed by Gu¨rkaynak and Wright (2012), the US treasury
inflation protected securities’ (TIPS) forward rate dynamics have not been that dierent from their
nominal counterparts, indicating the term premia are also influenced by real factors. Second, Be-
nati and Goodhart (2008) observe that during the 2000’s the marginal predictive content of term
spreads to future output increased, although monetary policy uncertainty remained low. Finally,
dynamics of short-run rates and inflation expectations do not explain all the variability of long-
term rates, particularly in the last decade (De Graeve et al. (2009)). In view of that, next to nominal
1Other relevant contributions to the literature focus on the eects of learning about long-term inflation targets of
the central bank (Kozicki and Tinsley (2005)) or on the possible segmentation of short and long-term bond markets
(Vayanos and Vila (2009)), identifying other drivers of time varying risk premia.
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le factors, also real factors must be playing a role in explaining variations in term spreads.In order to provide an alternative real frictions view, we focus on the role of financial inter-mediation in the determination of term spreads. We develop a DSGE model with endogenous
term spreads derived from banks’ portfolio choice and their risk assessment of potential liquidity
shortages. The main feature of the banking structure in our model is the introduction of poten-
tial liquidity risks and relates to the contributions of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Diamond
and Rajan (2001; 2005). In our framework, banks hold a portfolio of equities, short and long-
term lending funded by short-term borrowing, thus they bear the risk of maturity transformation.
The presence of short and long-term lending opportunities is a result of the assumption of market
segmentation in capital investments. We assume banks’ long-term investments may suer from
potential liquidity shortages such that liquidity injections are required to maintain those assets in
the banks’ books. This formalises the maturity mismatch risk. Term spreads, which ultimately
denote the cost of hedging this potential risk, are determined by the volatility of future short-term
rates, as usual in the macro finance literature, and the additional element introduced here, the pre-
mium for bearing the maturity risk. We show that cash-flow patterns impact banks’ profitability
and hence their balance sheets, altering the risk premia derived from their portfolio decisions. We
label this additional mechanism that produces endogenous term spread movements due to maturity
mismatch risk, the bank’s portfolio channel.2
A key feature of our framework, that is absent in canonical macro-finance models that look
at the yield curve (e.g. Rudebusch and Swanson (2008), see also Rudebusch et al. (2007) for
a general discussion), is that endogenous movements in term spreads feed back to the macroe-
conomy. This interaction occurs since long-term rate’s influence investment in capital such that
entrepreneurs demand for loans is downward sloping in long-term interest rates.
In line with the existing empirical evidence, our theoretical model generates term premia mo-
vements that are good predictors of future real output. As the economy approaches the peak of the
business cycle, spreads tend to be at their lowest and will tend to increase thereafter. Similarly,
2The portfolio choice introduces a real friction that aects the yield curve. However, any nominal factor that alters
the risk of maturity transformation would also impact the bank decision and lead to term spread variations. Hence, in a
nominal model the proposed mechanism reflects the interaction between nominal and real factors.
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le as the economy approaches the bottom of the business cycle, spreads tend to be at their highest.We show that the endogenous movements in long-term rates and term spreads are linked to thefluctuations in the expected profitability of banks’ portfolios. Banks rely on the overall profitabi-
lity of their portfolio to cover for any liquidity needs. Hence, future profitability relates directly to
their appetite to bear maturity risk and thus to the risk premia they require to commit to provide
long-term funding to firms. As output growth falls during a recession, profitability is expected
to remain low and increase in the future and hence spreads are high; it is costly to pay variable
funding costs in the short-term to increase long-term earnings. As the economy approaches the
peak of the business cycle, profitability is expected to remain high and decrease in the future and
thus spreads tend to be low; risks of funding costs can be undertaken while profits remain high to
improve long-term earnings.
Our model, by creating a new policy channel, allows us to analyse the impact of unconventio-
nal monetary policies similar to the recent quantitative easing (QE) adopted in the US and the UK.
In our setting, the monetary authority, by altering bank’s balance sheet conditions, can influence
long-term rates and investment without relying on base-rate changes. The channel through which
QE aects the economy in our framework is distinct to the one stressed in some of the recent theo-
retical papers. For instance, in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) QE works through a direct replenishing
of banking capital, covering for current shortages. In contrast, unconventional monetary policy in
our framework aims to protect banks from potential liquidity shortages in the future, oering a
mechanism for the relaxation of future balance sheet constraints. This in turn leads to an increase
in banks’ willingness to carry maturity transformation risk and to a reduction in term spreads. We
find that allowing banks to sell long-term assets to the central bank after a liquidity shock leads
to a sharp decrease in term spreads matching the results presented by several empirical studies on
the recent QE policies in the US, the UK and the Eurozone. Furthermore, such interventions have
significant impact on long-term investments, decreasing the amplitude of output responses after
a liquidity shock. The base rate does not need to decrease as much as when only conventional
policies are implemented and the resulting inflation turns out to be higher.
Empirically, the importance of bank balance sheets and bank risk taking has recently been
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le stressed by Adrian and Shin (2010a; 2010b), and Adrian et al. (2010b). These authors show thatfinancial intermediary balance sheets contain strong predictive power for future excess returnson a broad set of equity, corporate, and Treasury bond portfolios; higher banking asset growth
is related to decreasing risk premia. This link between banks balance sheets and risk premia is
indeed present in our model. As a bank expects higher profits, it increases asset holdings and
consequently spreads decrease. While their work focuses more on leveraging and asset growth
rates, the mechanism behind the link between balance sheets and risk premia in our model is
distinct; we look particularly at the role of the variability of expected bank profits and the maturity
transformation risk.
Focusing on bank profitability and the yield curve, we present three distinct sets of empirical
evidence. First, we document bank level microeconometric evidence on the link between expected
profitability (obtained from survey data) and yield spreads giving support to our main theoretical
channel. We find that an increase in US bank level expected financial business profitability (as
measured by the expected mean forecast in earnings per share for major US financial institutions)
leads to a significant decline in yield spreads next to variations in real output and inflation. Second,
using a vector autoregression (VAR) and employing the identification of Barsky and Sims (2011)
to separate contemporaneous and expected future innovations (news) in bank profitability, we
report a negative correlation between spreads today and expected changes in bank profitability.
Third, we document the impact of shocks to monetary policy, output and consumer expectations
(used as a proxy to an anticipated productivity shock) on the main macroeconomic variables. The
theoretical model’s dynamic properties are largely in line with the VAR impulse responses in all
three cases.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 presents a simple partial equilibrium model
to highlight the relationship between banks’ profits, balance sheets and term spreads. Section 2
describes the general equilibrium model of endogenous term spreads. We start presenting our re-
sults in Section 3, focusing on the main drivers of the endogenous movements in term spreads,
their potential to predict future output growth and the main dynamic properties of the model after
monetary and technology shocks. Section 4 discusses unconventional monetary policies. Eco-
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le nometric evidence on the link between expected financial business profitability and spreads, insupport of our channel, and a VAR estimation to study term spreads’ dynamic responses to the keymacroeconomic shocks are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
1. A Simple Model of Bank’s Portfolio Choice
We start by presenting a simple partial equilibrium model of the banks’ portfolio decision
aiming at explaining the basic link between banks’ balance sheet (portfolio), their profits and
the inclination of the yield curve. In the next section, we analyse a similar decision problem
in a general equilibrium model to explore the eects of endogenous fluctuations of spreads on
economic activity and monetary policy.
The simple model has three periods. At period zero, the bank selects a portfolio of assets and
holds them until maturity. While assets are in the balance sheet, the bank must fund them with
short-term deposits. We assume bank’s portfolio may contain three assets: a long-term asset (XL),
a short-term asset (XS ) and equity (or a portfolio of the rest of risky short-term assets available in
the economy), denoted by Z. The short-term asset pays out a certain return of RS one period after
the portfolio has been set. Equities also pay out in period 1, however, their return RZ is uncertain.
Long-term assets mature and pay out a certain return of RL two periods after the portfolio decision,
however, the bank might be forced to make an injection of liquidity (%) in its own balance sheet
to keep the long-term assets that were funded with short-term borrowing in the portfolio during
period 1.
This liquidity injection, similar to the one used in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998),3 eectively
implies that the bank may be exposed to cash flow shocks at period 1, leading to an ex-post
revaluation of the overall return on long-term asset holdings, replicating problems of balance sheet
funding.4 Thus, % can be understood as a reduced form shock to the maturity mismatch exposures
3We simplify their framework, excluding moral hazard problems and the potential for bank failures, to focus parti-
cularly on term spreads.
4Note that ex-post revaluations might occur if a portion of long-term assets must be sold due to lack of funding.
Hence, although the liquidity injection in the model occurs on the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet, it can also be
understood as a reduced form liability shortage shock.
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le in the bank’s balance sheet. The bank fully funds its portfolio with deposits (D) that provide theholder with a gross return of RD.In order to depict the basic channel as clearly as possible, we simplify a number of features
that are part of the bank’s portfolio choice in our main model (Section 2). Firstly, we focus on the
portfolio decision at time zero only, with short-term assets and equity remaining in the balance
sheet for one period and long-term assets for two periods. Secondly, we assume deposits are in
infinite supply at the equilibrium short-term rate and RD is exogenously set and constant for the
two periods the long-term assets are held.5 These simplifications allow us to concentrate on the
bank’s decision of how much long-term asset to hold at time zero, the point when long-term rates,
and thus term spreads, are set. The main factors aecting this decision will then be the bank’s
expected profitability and the liquidity risk the long-term asset holder bears.
In order to study term spread fluctuations banks must care about risk. For simplicity we assume
banks are risk averse.6 The bank problem, formally, is
max
fXS ;XL;Z;D0;D1g
E
h
B
i
s:t: B =
(B1 )
1 B
1   B + 
(B2 )
1 B
1   B
B1 = (RZ   1)Z + (RS   1)XS   %XL   (RD   1)D0
B2 = (RL   1)XL   (RD   1)D1
D0 = Z + XL + XS
D1 = XL (1)
where Bi is the bank profits at time i = 1; 2.
It is straightforward to see that short-term rates will be equal to the return on deposits. The key
equation to determine the long-term exposure in the bank’s portfolio and therefore the long-term
5Note that volatility of short-term funding costs could also generate increased maturity transformation risk. In the
general equilibrium model in Section 2 short-term rates will be endogenous and thus we incorporate this risk there.
Moreover, changes in short-term rates also result in valuation gains or losses on long-term assets in the portfolio. These
will also be included in the general equilibrium model.
6In Aksoy and Basso (2012) we show that assuming banks are subject to a (constant) Value-at-Risk constraint yields
similar results.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le rate is7  E h(B1 ) B(RD   1 + %)i + E h(B2 ) B(RL   RD)i = 0 (2)
If banks do not care about risk (B = 0) then term spreads will be constant (the slope of the
yield curve will depend only on E[%]). If banks are risk averse then term spreads will depend on
the expected path of profits. When expected profits in period 1 increase relative to the profits in
period 2, due to higher expected return on equity, then the first term of equation (2) decreases.
Consequently, in equilibrium, long-term rates also decrease while the bank’s demand for long-
term assets increases. Bank’s portfolio selection implicitly determines a structure of cash flows in
periods 1 and 2. Banks are more willing to increase long-term exposures that will provide cash-
flows in the future if profits are relatively high during the interim period when these exposures are
funded and liquidity shortages may occur. In short, higher profits on investments allow banks to
cover for potential liquidity shortages and cash-flow mismatches.
The portfolio choice that implicitly determines the term premia is made at time zero, but
depends on profits in periods 1 and 2 while the long-term asset is in the balance sheet. Hence, the
portfolio channel highlighted here is forward looking in nature; what matters are expected profits
and not how they respond in the current period. Note that the covariance between profits in the
interim period (B1 ) and funding costs (RD   1 + %) and the covariance between final profits (B2 )
and gains from long-term asset holding (RL  RD) will also be important to determine the extent to
which an increase in relative profitability aects the first term of equation (2) relative to its second
term. We will discuss the role of these covariance terms in more detail in the general equilibrium
model.
2. General Equilibrium Model
In the previous section we presented a partial equilibrium model of bank’s portfolio choice,
establishing a link between bank’s appetite to bear maturity transformation risk, its balance sheet
7Equity holdings will be determined by E
h
(B1 )
 B (RZ   RD)
i
= 0.
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le holdings and its expected profits from portfolio investments. During periods in which the assetsheld in their balance sheets are expected to pay higher returns, banks are willing to increase ex-posure to maturity transformation risk, increasing long-term asset holdings and charging lower
risk premia. In this section, we generalise and extend our simple portfolio choice model. Speci-
fically, we endogenise term spreads embedding a banking sector’s portfolio choice into a DSGE
framework. We then study their eects on economic activity and monetary policy.
The model economy is populated by a continuum i 2 [0; 1] of intermediate good producers,
a final good producer, a continuum of households, banks, entrepreneurs and the central bank.
Entrepreneurs borrow funds from a bank and transform consumption goods into capital. There
are two types of entrepreneurs, one with access to a short-run investment project and one with
a long-run investment opportunity available. This introduces a segmentation of short and long-
term funding requirements, similar to the one stressed by Vayanos and Vila (2009). As a result,
banks can invest in short and long-term assets in distinct markets. Intermediate good producer i
hires labour from households, produces a dierentiated input using labour and the current capital
stock. At the end of the period it sells the inputs to the final good firm and buys new capital from
entrepreneurs. The final good firm combines all inputs to produce consumption goods that are
then sold to households and entrepreneurs. We assume households (workers) receive the profits
from banks and entrepreneurs, which are all of unit mass. Thus, only households consume.8
The bank receives deposits from households, provides loans to both entrepreneur types and
buys equity from the intermediate firms. Note that long-term loans are issued at every period but
do last for two periods, thus banks’ balance sheets will contain three loan agreements. These are: a
short-term loan, a long-term loan and another long-term loan issued in the previous period. Finally,
we assume that during the current period the bank might need to make a liquidity injection into its
balance sheet to keep long-term assets that are funded with short-term borrowing in its portfolio.
Figure 1 shows the production and financial flows of the model.
8An equivalent alternative would be to follow a model structure similar to Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), where a
family is split into banks and consumers but consumption is done at the family level.
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le Figure 1: Model Structure
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2.1. Households
The household maximises its expected discounted lifetime utility given by
max
Ct ;Ht ;Dt
E0
1X
t=0
t
0BBBBB@C1 t1      H
1+
t
1 + 
1CCCCCA ;  2 (0; 1) ; ;  > 0 (3)
where Ct denotes the household’s total consumption and Ht denotes the composite labour index.
The curvature parameters ;  are strictly positive.  is the discount factor. The household faces
the following budget constraint
Ct +
Dt
Pt
6
WtHt
Pt
+
Rt 1;CBDt 1
Pt
+
˜t
Pt
; (4)
where Wt is the wage index and Rt;CB is the rate of return on deposits Dt. The central bank sets
Rt;CB according to a monetary policy rule to be specified. We assume the only asset available to
the “worker” is a deposit made directly to the financial intermediary, thus only banks invest in
equities issued by the intermediate good firms and lend to entrepreneurs. Although not modelled
here, one reason for that would be the existence of higher household-firm agency costs relative to
bank-firm agency costs.
Finally, nominal profits realised at period t for entrepreneurs with short-term projects, with
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le long-term projects and the bank, respectively, are passed on to the household (˜t = ˜ESt + ˜ELt +Bt Pt).
2.1.1. Optimal Wage Setting
Households supply a continuum of labour types j 2 [0; 1]. The composite labour index Ht is
then given by
Ht =
 Z 1
0
H
"w 1
"w
j;t
! "w
"w 1
: (5)
From the subsequent intermediate firms minimisation problem we have that the demand for
each labour type and the wage index are given by
H j;t =
 
W j;t
Wt
! "w
Ht; and (6)
Wt =
 Z 1
0
W1 "wj;t
! 1
1 "w
: (7)
Households, when allowed (Calvo scheme with parameter !w), set wages W j;t to maximise
expected utility subject to the budget constraint and the labour demand equation. The main rea-
son to include both price and wage rigidity is to ensure firms’ dividends are pro-cyclical after a
productivity shock (see Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007)).
2.2. Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are responsible for capital formation. There are two types of entrepreneurs,
one who invests in short-term projects and one who invests in long-term projects. This ensures a
separation between the markets for short and long-term funding. As such, we assume a set of mass
unit of entrepreneurs has a short-term investment opportunity available, at each period. Another
set of mass unit of entrepreneurs has a long-term (two periods) investment opportunity available,
at each period. Thus, there are always three mass units of active entrepreneurs in the economy.
Short-term entrepreneurs borrow funds from the bank (XS ;t), buy consumption goods and
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le transform these into capital next period using the following production functionykSt+1 = S ln(1 + XS ;t): (8)
The capital produced is then sold to the intermediate good firms. The profits of these entrepreneurs
are given by
˜ESt+1 = Pt+1q
S
t+1S ln(1 + XS ;t)   Rt;S PtXS ;t; (9)
where Rt;S is the gross interest rate on short-term borrowing and qSt is the price of short-term
capital denominated in consumption goods. Short-term entrepreneurs select XS ;t to maximise
expected profits.
Long-term entrepreneurs also borrow from the bank (XL;t), buy consumption goods and trans-
form these into capital after two periods with the following production function
ykLt+2 = L ln(1 + XL;t); (10)
where L > S . The capital produced is then sold to the intermediate good firms. Long-term
entrepreneurs profits are given by
˜ELt+2 = Pt+2q
L
t+2L ln(1 + XL;t)   Rt;LPtXL;t; (11)
where Rt;L is the gross interest rate on long-term borrowing and qLt is the price of long-term capital
denominated in consumption goods. Long-term entrepreneurs select XL;t to maximise expected
profits.
The production function for short and long-term capital output (ykm) is assumed to take the
form m ln(1 + Xm;t) for m = fS ; Lg; for two key reasons. Firstly, we need capital production to
have decreasing returns (concave function) such that movements in borrowing rates influence the
marginal propensity to invest. That ensures the demand of long-term and short-term borrowing is
downward sloping on their respective interest rates (see equations (B.12) and (B.13) in Appendix
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le B). Secondly, that functional form ensures each unit of consumption good invested (Xm;t) is turnedinto one unit of capital plus an increment, which decreases as the amount invested increases andwhose overall size depends on the parameter m (this interpretation holds as long as Xm;t is small
and m close to one, which will be the case in our calibration). We also assume that L > S or
that, for the same level of investment, long-term capital is more productive than short-term capital
due to the potential liquidity problem banks may face on long-term asset holdings.9
2.3. Banks
At every period t; a bank, representing all financial business in the economy, acquires three
types of nominal assets: a short-term debt (PtXS ;t), a long-term debt (PtXL;t) and equity (Zt).10
Furthermore, the bank has a long-term asset it carries over from last period (Pt 1XL;t 1). The
bank funds these investments with short-term deposits (Dt) from households. Diamond (1989;
1991; 2004), amongst others, provide agency-based explanations for the usage of short-term debt
as the optimal funding instrument for banks, theoretically supporting the balance sheet structure
employed here.11 Equities are acquired from the intermediate good producers. The investment in
equity made at time t, Zt, pays o a return (dividend plus capital gains) at period t + 1, denoted by
TREt+1 (presented in detail in the intermediate good producer problem). Short-term entrepreneurs
pay back the loan made at time t in period t + 1, providing a return to the bank of (RS ;t   1)PtXS ;t.
Long-term entrepreneurs pay back the loan made at time t   1 in period t + 1, providing a return
to the bank of (RL;t 1   1)Pt 1XL;t 1 where RL;t 1 is the nominal long-term rate set at time t   1.
Finally, long-term asset holdings, acquired at time t, may change in value at t + 1 due to changes
in short-term rates (Vt+1;t) and may require a liquidity injection at time t + 1 of %t+1Pt+1 per
unit of the long-term assets that is funded by short-term borrowing in the balance sheet (which
9This assumption eectively ensures that at steady state XL;t and XS ;t are not far apart.
10We include equity as the additional asset since New Keynesian models already embed firm equity and thus we
keep the framework as simple as possible. More importantly, 68% of total market value of shares in the US is held by
institutional investors (Lewellen (2011)), which are themselves integrated to or part of the various financial businesses
we aim to capture. Nonetheless, extending the variety of assets is an interesting avenue for future research, particularly
including risky loans to incorporate credit risk fluctuations. As long as default risk is pro-cyclical, as is the total return
in equity in our model, the results we obtain on term spreads movements remain qualitatively the same.
11This balance sheet structure has been prevalent in the financial sector (at least) until the most recent crisis (see
Brunnermeier (2009) for a discussion)
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le in our framework is simply equal to XL;t). We assume that the liquidity shock is given by %t =(1   L)%¯ + L%t 1 + eL, where eL is an i:i:d: normal shock.As in our simple model %t is understood as a reduced form shock to the maturity mismatch
exposures in the bank’s balance sheet (originating from either the liability or asset side). It is
important to dissociate %t from an aggregate shock that increases the default rate in the economy.12
A change in %t occurs due to funding or balance sheet problems and is thought to be unrelated to
the fundamental value of long-term asset holdings. Acharya et al. (2011), for instance, present a
model highlighting how a funding problem might occur even when the fundamental value of asset
holdings remains high.
Note that although it is natural to think of %t > 013, or potential liquidity shortages, we could
also have liquidity gains with %t < 0, for instance due to an increase in the prospective gains from
securitisation of long-term assets in the banks’ balance sheets. In this case, instead of liquidity
shortages, the banking sector is characterised by excess liquidity, which could give rise to an
inverted yield curve with long-term rates lower than short-term rates. That might have been the
case in the UK during the few years preceding the 2007 crisis. An interesting extension of the
model left for future research is to make %t endogenous based on the potential for securitisation
vis-a-vis the expected need for liquid funds/provisions or shortage of funding.
Bank’s total profits at period t + 1 will therefore have six main components: (i) the total return
on equity (TRE), which includes both dividends and capital gains; (ii) payments from long-term
positions that matured; (iii) payments from short-term positions that matured; (iv) costs of deposit
funding; (v) liquidity costs (or gains) from maturity mismatch; and finally (vi) gains or losses from
the re-valuation of long-term positions held in the balance sheet, denoted Vt+1;t. Formally,
Bt+1 =
1
Pt+1
h
TREt+1 + (RL;t 1   1)Pt 1XL;t 1 + (RS ;t   1)PtXS ;t   Dt(Rt;CB   1)
 %t+1XL;tPt+1 + PtXL;tVt+1;t
i
: (12)
12Although such a shock might be a trigger for the potential liquidity problems we model through a change in %t.
13In fact we do assume %¯ > 0, or liquidity shortages are expected at steady state, to ensure we obtain an upward
sloping yield curve, matching the data in the US.
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where the forward rate is given by t+1 ft+2 =
RL;t
RS ;t
. Therefore, if interest rates are constant from t
until t + 1 , it follows that Vt+1;t = 0.
We assume banks are risk averse. The only risk involved in the banking business in our model
is the maturity transformation risk. The bank commits to lend money to long-term investment
opportunities having to acquire funds next period to re-finance this balance sheet commitment
plus any additional liquidity injection needed. Risk aversion here implies that the bank does not
only care about the return on short and long-term assets, requiring them simply to pay the same
expected return on average. The bank weighs these returns according to the expected profits
of the entire portfolio, requiring higher premium to bear risk when overall profitability is low but
accepting lower risk compensation when overall returns are high. Eectively, the bank cares about
the covariance between the returns of each asset and the returns of the overall portfolio.
Note that even if banks were risk neutral, the limits on Value-at-Risk (VaR) banks normally
abide to would eectively imply that overall profitability of assets would influence banks’ re-
quired premium to bear maturity risk through the VaR constraint. Hence, the assumption that
banks are risk averse reflects that some measure of overall riskiness and expected profits aect
their long-term asset demand decision or implicitly the premium they require for bearing maturity
transformation risk. The bank’s profit maximisation problem is given by14
max
fXS ;t ;XL;t ;Dt ;Ztg1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
t
Bt
1 B
1   B (14)
s:t: Dt = PtXS ;t + PtXL;t + Zt + Pt 1XL;t 1;
14Although we include Zt in the set of choice variables in the maximisation for completeness, given that equity is
the best asset in the portfolio, paying a gross return higher than the short-term rate, banks will always demand the total
amount of equity supplied by intermediate firms.
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Given the potential for liquidity shocks or the risk of maturity transformation, the bank will require
a premium to hold long-term positions, or RL;t > RS ;t. If the bank were to hedge this maturity risk
they could go long on short-term assets (for instance short-term government bonds) and go short
on long-term assets (for instance long-term government bonds). The overall cost of such a hed-
ging portfolio would be the dierence between short-term and long-term government yields or the
term spread.15 Thus, assume the bank is considering whether to increase its holdings of long-term
assets which are funded by short-term borrowing. At the margin, this additional position could be
oset by buying the hedging portfolio such that no additional return is gained nor risk undertaken.
If the bank decides to hold that additional position unhedged, it must receive the premium ade-
quate to the risk undertaken. As a result, at the margin, the dierence RL;t   RS ;t is directly related
to the term premium in the government bond market. As such, we define term spreads (annualised
in percentage points) between long and short-term rate in the same fashion as the macro-ane
literature
tpt =
1
2

(RL;t   1)   (Rt;CB   1)   (Rt+1;CB   1) 400: (15)
2.4. Firms
The final good representative firm combines a continuum of intermediate inputs i 2 [0; 1] with
the following production function
Yt =
 Z 1
0
y
" 1
"
i;t
! "
" 1
: (16)
15This occurs since our model does not include default or credit risk. If that were to be the case we could decompose
the bank’s overall risk by the term spread exposure plus the credit exposure, which could be hedged by credit default
derivatives or default insurance.
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The intermediate sector is constituted of a continuum of firms i 2 [0; 1] producing dierentia-
ted inputs with the following constant returns to scale production function
yi;t = AtKSi;t

KLi;t
(1 )
H1 i;t ; (18)
where At denotes the productivity level at time t (which follows the standard AR(1) process
log(At) = Alog(At 1) + eA, where eA is an i:i:d: normal shock), KSi;t is the capital stock origi-
nated from short-term projects, KLi;t is the capital stock originated from long-term projects and Hi;t
is the household composite labour used in production. Each firm i hires labour and invests in both
stocks of capital. Implicit here is the assumption that short-term and long-term capital are not per-
fect substitutes, which reflects the fact that long-term projects might have a distinct technological
enhancement compared to capital based on short-run investments. This assumption ensures the
price of each capital type are potentially dierent. As such, fluctuations in economic activity can
have distinct eects on short and long-term credit demand influencing the determination of the
yield curve.
To characterise the problem of the intermediate firms, we split their decision into a pricing
decision (given their real marginal cost) and a cost minimisation decision. Following the standard
Calvo pricing scheme (!), firm i, when allowed, sets prices Pi;t according to
max
Pi;t
Et
26666664 1X
s=0
Pt+sQt;t+s!sYi;t+s
 
Pi;t
Pt+s
  t+s;i
!37777775 ; (19)
subject to the demand function (equation (17)), where Qt;t+s is the economy’s stochastic discount
factor, defined in the Appendix B, andt+s;i is the firm’s i real marginal cost at time t+ s. To obtain
the real marginal cost, we need to solve the firm’s intertemporal cost minimisation problem. That
is
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subject to the production function (equation (18)) and investment equation Imi;t = K
m
i;t+1  (1  )Kmi;t
for m = fS ; Lg, where  is the depreciation rate.16
Finally, total return on equity is given by
TREi;t = Pi;tYi;t  WtHi;t   Pt(qSt ISi;t + qLt ILi;t) + Pt(qSt KSt+1 + qLt KLt+1)   Zt; (21)
where Zt = Pt 1(qSt 1K
S
t + q
L
t 1K
L
t ). The first three terms comprise the flow of profits (dividends)
and the last two the capital gains (due to changes in amount and price of capital held in the inter-
mediate firms). We assume equities are bought (or evaluated) by banks at the end of time t   1.
Thus, the value of the intermediate firms at the beginning of time t, denoted Zt, is equal to the
value of its capital holdings (before production and investment in (new) capital takes place during
period t) times their prices, all set at period t   1.
2.5. Market Clearing Conditions
The capital market clearing conditions are given by
ISt = yk
S
t = S ln(1 + XS ;t 1); and (22)
ILt = yk
L
t = L ln(1 + XL;t 2): (23)
The good market clearing condition, or the aggregate demand, is given by
Yt = Ct + XS ;t + XL;t + %tXL;t 1: (24)
16Note that the demand for each type of labour stated in the household wage setting problem can be obtained by
minimising the total cost of labour
R j
0
W j;tHi; j;td j subject to the labour composite index.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le Capital and labour markets across intermediate firms are aggregated such thatKmt = Z 1
0
Kmi;tdi for m = S ; L and Ht =
Z 1
0
H j;td j: (25)
The credit market clearing condition is
Dt
Pt
= XS ;t + XL;t +
Zt
Pt
+
XL;t 1
t
; (26)
where ZtPt =
(qSt 1K
S
t +q
L
t 1K
L
t )
t
and t =
Pt
Pt 1 .
Finally, we assume the central bank sets monetary policy (conventional) according to a stan-
dard monetary rule given by17
Rt;CB
R¯CB
=
"
t
¯
 Yt
Y¯
Y #
; (27)
where X¯ is the steady state value of a variable Xt.
2.6. Equilibrium and Calibration
The equilibrium of the economy is defined as the Lagrange multiplier ftg, the allocation
set fCt;Ht;KSt+1;KLt+1; XS ;t; XL;t;Yt;Dt; ISt ; ILt ;TREt ;Bt g and the vector of prices fPi;t, t, wt, w j;t,
RL;t, Rt;CB, qSt , q
L
t , Rs;t, tptg such that the household, the final good firm, intermediate firms,
entrepreneurs and the bank maximisation problems are solved, and the market clearing conditions
hold.
Details of the equations that determine the recursive equilibrium and the steady state of the
economy are shown in Appendix B. Before discussing the results we quickly present the main
parameter values used for the benchmark version of our model. As standard we set the goods
market mark-up to 20%, thus  = 6. The labour market mark-up is set to 7.5% or w = 14.18 We
set the discount factor  = 0:99, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption  = 1
17As spreads move endogenously, one could verify whether the monetary rule should be augmented to include term
spreads. In this model the addition of term spreads to the rule does not yield higher welfare (results available upon
request). In an alternative model with lending relationships we showed that inserting endogenous banking spreads into
the rule improves welfare (see Aksoy et al. (2013)).
18While some contributions to the DSGE literature set w = 21 others set w = 2. Our results are unchanged when
we vary w within this range.
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le and the Frisch elasticity of labour supply  = 1. The Calvo price and wage parameters are ! = 0:5and !w = 0:6.19 The depreciation rate is set to  = 0:05 and the share of capital in production to
 = 0:36. Fan et al. (2012) report that the debt maturity ratio, (that is, long-term interest bearing
debt over total debt) is about 80% in the US, 60% in the UK, 55% in Germany and 40% in Japan
during the period 1991-2006. They found that the median long-term debt ratio across 39 dierent
countries is estimated to be around 60%. Hence we set the share of short run capital to  = 0:4
ensuring the steady state share of long-term loans in total loans to be 60%. We set the degree of
risk aversion of banks to B = 1, which is the same as the one for the household.
The steady state long-term rate is given by RL = 12 +
%¯
 and thus depends on the liquidity
shortage at steady state (%¯). We set %¯ = 0:0025, such that the 10 year term premium is roughly
100 basis points matching the US data (Rudebusch and Swanson (2008)). We initially assume
that the central bank follows a simple Taylor Rule with inflation parameter  = 2:5 and output
gap parameter Y = 0:125: Note that higher values of Y and lower values of  easily lead to
indeterminacy issues in models with cost channels (see Aksoy et al. (2011)). Finally, we set the
persistence of the productivity process A = 0:8 and the persistence of liquidity shocks L = 0:8,
while setting the standard deviation of their respective disturbances to va = 0:01 and vl = 0:0001.
In order to incorporate the covariance eect on the bank’s portfolio decision, the model is solved
to a third order approximation using Dynare++ (without centralisation).
3. Term Spreads and Economic Activity
In this section we analyse the mechanism that drives term spread fluctuations in our model, the
link between spread movements and future output growth and finally present the impulse responses
to contemporaneous productivity and monetary shocks.
19These are a bit smaller than the ones obtained in DSGE-based Bayesian estimations. However, most of these
studies have assumed wage and price indexation decreasing the eect of nominal rigidity on economic activity, while
here for simplicity we do not. Our results are unchanged when lower degrees of price and wage rigidity are assumed.
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le 3.1. Endogenous Term SpreadsWe start by focusing on the channel that governs the fluctuations of term spreads in our model.
The key equilibrium condition (see Appendix B for details) that determines the long-term rate, and
consequently term spreads, comes from the bank’s portfolio decision. The bank will set long-term
assets holdings (XL;t) such that
Et
"
Bt+1
 B
 
Rt;CB   1   Vt+1;t
t+1
+ %t+1
!#
= Et
"
1
t+1t+2
Bt+2
 B(RL;t   Rt+1;CB)
#
: (28)
As we stressed in Section 1, this is intrinsically a forward looking condition. A portfolio
decision made at time t is influenced by the relative path of expected profits in periods t + 1 and
t + 2. In order to highlight this feature we look at the dynamic responses in our model economy
when agents expect productivity to be higher in the next period.
Figure 2 shows impulse responses for output, bank profits, the short-term rate and term spreads
to a one period ahead positive shock in productivity. For all variables the percentage deviation from
steady state is shown except for term spreads movements where the change in the percentage rate
is reported (thus a 0.2 deviation implies a 20 basis point change in term spreads).
As expected, a positive news about productivity increases output initially as investment in
capital increases. When high productivity materialises, output increases further and is expected
to converge back to steady state thereafter. Bank profits jump with the shock as high price of
capital imply high equity valuation. Bank profits are expected to stay high in the following period
and then become negative with the equity value decreasing as the economy converges back to
equilibrium. We note that short-term interest rates increase and term spreads decline in the period
the news is known; equivalently long-term rates do not increase as much as short-term rates.
The movements in spreads can be understood by looking at the endogenous response of bank
profits after the shock. Long-term asset exposures undertaken in the current period must be funded
during the next period, since these are kept in the balance sheet, when liquidity injections might
be needed. After two periods these assets mature and pay excess returns. The bank is less likely
to suer from balance sheet problems if, when liquidity injections are needed, profits are relati-
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le Figure 2: Endogenous Spread Movements
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vely high as compared to the period in which the long term assets mature. This is because cash
flows from high profits can be used to cover for these required injections. As a result, bearing
maturity risk in the interim period becomes relatively cheaper, bank’s demand for long-term assets
increases, generating lower term spreads. Thus, after receiving the news that economic activity is
going to increase in the future, the bank sets term spreads lower since it expects profitability to
be high during the period funding costs must be paid. When expected profitability is increasing
(e.g. from period 2 onwards), profits in the funding periods will be relatively smaller. As a result,
bearing maturity risk becomes relatively more expensive and the opposite occurs.
In summary, endogenous spread movements arise in our model since changes in economic
conditions (as reflected by the paths of future profits) alter the relationship between the bank’s
shadow value of funding costs (paid as the long-term assets are held in the balance sheet) and
their payos (materialised when these assets mature). When relying on a high order solution to
the model, these variations in shadow value will not only depend on relative profits at time t + 1
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le and t + 2, but also on how they relate with the size and the variations of funding costs, given by (Rt;CB 1) Vt+1;tt+1 + %t+1.In order to further investigate endogenous movements in term spreads, we present three va-
riants of our model when agents receive positive news on future productivity. In the first case, we
set a higher steady state liquidity shortage (%¯ = 0:0125), increasing the expected value of funding
costs. We denote this case as highliq. In the second case, we set a high variance of liquidity shock
(vl = 0:04), which increases the variability of funding costs. We denote this case as highvl. Finally,
in the third case, we assume that the bank is more risk-averse and set B = 2. We denote this case
as highB . Figure 3 compares the dynamic responses of spreads and bank profits for these three
cases, against the benchmark model.
Figure 3: Fluctuations in Term Spreads
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In all three cases bank profits move in a very similar way after the shock. Therefore, in order to
distinguish the three cases, we need to uncover how the same response in profits leads to dierent
dynamics in term spreads, exploring the relationship between profits and funding costs. In the
first variant, we observe that spread movements are amplified under higher steady state liquidity
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le shortages. The intuition for this result is as follows: at the steady state, the bank sets long-termrates higher than short-term rates to oset potential liquidity shortages and hence, the higher %¯ orthe higher the average need for liquidity injection, the higher will the steady state long-term rates
be. Given that long-term rates are relatively high, an equivalent increase in bank profits (when
compared to the benchmark case) induces a stronger adjustment in long-term rates, which in turn
implies long-term rates falling (relative to short-term rates) by a greater amount than under the
benchmark case.
The opposite occurs when the variance of the liquidity shock is high. The bank is willing to
bear more maturity risk in periods of high profits since they know that high profits can be used to
oset liquidity shortages. However, the more volatile are these shortages, the less certain the bank
will be that high profits will be enough to oset them. Therefore, an equivalent movement in bank
profits leads to smaller movements in term spreads after a positive productivity shock.
The third variant illustrates that the term spreads is more responsive to shocks as the degree of
bank risk aversion increases. B eectively determines how fluctuations of bank profits influence
the bank’s long-term rates decision. When B ! 0; the bank will set long-term rates to be
a discounted sum of short-term rates and term spreads will be constant. This mechanism is the
same as the one explored in the macro-finance literature where Epstein-Zin preferences are used to
increase risk aversion in order to match volatility of risk/term premia (see Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012)).
The same conclusions on the eects of changes in expected bank profits on term spread fluc-
tuations can be analytically drawn by exploring a higher order approximation to the portfolio
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le choice equation (28) (the derivation is shown in Appendix C).20Etbtp+0:5(btp)2 = Et"BdBt+2 dBt+1+0:5B dBt+22 dBt+12!+ %¯  d%t+1+0:5d%t+12+CovTerms+# (29)
CovTerms =  B dBt+1 %¯  d%t+1 B dBt+1 1  ([RCB;t  [Vt+1;t)+B dBt+1dt+1
 
h
1
  ([RCB;t  [Vt+1;t)+   d%t+1idt+1+B dBt+20BBBB@ 1 +%¯  dRL;t  1  [RCB;t+1 dt+1 dt+21CCCCA
+
0BBBB@ 1 +%¯  dRL;t  1  [RCB;t+11CCCCA(dt+1+dt+2) dt+2dt+1: (30)
The first term on the right hand side of the variations in term premium equation shows how
relative profits impact spreads to a first order. As easily verified, setting B = 0, or assuming
bank’s utility is linear on profits, eliminates all the eects of movements of profits on term spread
decisions. Looking at the covariance terms we observe that the higher the covariance between
profits, dBt+1, and the liquidity shortage, d%t+1, (see the first term of CovTerms), the lower term
spreads will be, with the strength of the eect being positively associated with B and %¯. Hence,
as we increase %¯, keeping the expected changes in profits constant, movements in spreads are
amplified.
Finally, the increase in the variance of the liquidity shock vl has two opposing eects. Firstly,
it tends to raise spreads since E(d%t+1)2 has a positive impact on spreads. Secondly, it becomes a
stronger driver of the expected covariance between dBt+1 and d%t+1.21 The latter implies that the
expected positive movement in profits due to the shock will have little eect on the covariance
term and as such one of the drivers of the endogenous movements of spreads loses its significance.
As a result of this eect on the covariance, higher volatility of liquidity shocks dampens the impact
of future productivity shocks on term spreads.
Our empirical results, presented in Section 5, confirm the relationship between spreads and
financial sector profitability obtained here. When expected profitability of financial business in-
creases, spreads fall. The model also generates a negative link between bank’s asset holdings and
term premia. Adrian et al. (2010b) present empirical evidence of this negative relationship across
20 includes all quadratic terms that do not depend on profits or the liquidity shock.
21Note that although we only presented a second order approximation here the model is solved to a third order
approximation allowing for fluctuations in this covariance term, or essentially involving a term dependent on dBt+1(d%t+1)2.
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le various asset classes. They stress that the relationship is a result of time variation in discount ratesand not due to the potential link between bank’s asset growth and expected future cash flows (ofthe market portfolio). Note that the mechanism we highlight depends on the expected future cash
flows, but the cash flows of the banks, who are selecting asset holdings and influencing risk pre-
mia, and not those of the equity market portfolio. We model the bank’s portfolio decision in order
to uncover the potential causes for changes in discount rates, which in turn lead to changes in asset
holdings. We propose that these variations may relate to the future path of bank profits. Thus,
although we focus on expectations of bank cash flows, we see our mechanism as complementary
to the one of Adrian et al. (2010b), who stress the importance of variable discount rates in their
empirical work. This is further attested by our focus on the Euler equation (28) from the bank
problem as a driver of term premia fluctuations.
Although we focus on term spreads, augmenting our model to include dierent assets in the
bank’s portfolio would possibly allow us to further explore the links between financial interme-
diation and the macroeconomy, extending the analysis to other risk premia. In fact, if risky loans
were included into the model, variation in default probability would reinforce the channel we pre-
sented. Positive news on economic activity would not only lead to high price of equities but also
to an increase in the expected value of risky loans as a result of lower default probabilities. Thus,
expected bank profits would increase due to both assets, allowing the bank to increase its overall
exposure and depressing risk premia.
3.2. Yield Spreads and Output Growth
As stressed by Gu¨rkaynak and Wright (2012), term structure models should generate a high
slope of the yield curve at the beginning of recoveries from recessions and a relatively flatter yield
curve towards the end of booms, feature which is related to the predictive power of yield spreads.
Hamilton and Kim (2002) conclude that lower term premiums predict slower GDP growth, al-
though this eect appears to be strong only in the short-run, while Wright (2006) shows that lower
term premium raises the odds of a recession.
In order to verify if the dynamics of term spreads in our model are consistent with this feature,
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le Figure 4 plots the impact of a four quarters anticipated technology shock. Thus, at time t agentslearn that there will be a productivity shock at time t+4. Based on the information at time t; thebank forms an expectation of future growth and profits which will aect long-term rates and thus
term spreads. These then feed back to the economy influencing long-term investment and output.
Figure 4: Anticipated Productivity Shock
0 2 4 6 8 10
−0.01
0
0.01
Output
0 2 4 6 8 10
−2
0
2
x 10−3 Inflation
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
0.05
Long term Investment
0 2 4 6 8 10
−0.05
0
0.05
Bank Profits
0 2 4 6 8 10
−5
0
5
x 10−3 Base Rate
0 2 4 6 8 10
−5
0
5
x 10−3 Long Term Rate
0 2 4 6 8 10
−5
0
5
x 10−3 Consumption
0 2 4 6 8 10
−0.2
0
0.2
Term Spread
We observe that output and long-term investment increase from t until t + 4 (time of the reali-
sation of the productivity shock). Therefore, if one is regressing output gains (byt+3  byt) on btpt (a
variant of Hamilton and Kim (2002) estimation) getting a positive parameter estimate must imply
that btpt > 0, which is what we obtain. The future path of bank profits allow us to explain the
observed term spread fluctuations. Bank profits will initially become negative, but are expected to
increase making it relatively more costly to bear maturity risk. Hence, long-term rates and spreads
increase in period t. Spreads are at their highest when output is at its lowest. At t + 3, productivity
is about to reach its peak, output is approaching its highest point and spreads their lowest point;
bank profits are high but are expected to decrease in a few periods. This alters the shadow value
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le of funding costs versus gains from long-term asset holdings, such that spreads reach their lowestpoint (is relatively cheaper to bear maturity risk). Therefore, as observed in the data, high slopedyield curve indicates future output is increasing while a flatter yield curve indicates that output is
reaching its peak.
Rudebusch et al. (2007) refer to a potential contradiction while discussing the intuition behind
the results of regressions of output growth on the level of term spreads.22 The level regression
suggests that low spreads lead to lower output in the future. However, under a standard IS curve,
low term spreads should result in higher investment (assuming it depends on long-term rates)
and thus higher output in the future. They confirm this view in the data by estimating output
dierences (by) on spread dierences (btp), obtaining the expected negative parameter estimate.
As opposed to the standard models in the macro-finance literature where the yield curve is build
based on the stochastic discount factor, the term premium here has a direct eect on long-term
investment and output and thus this mechanism is in place. Hence, our model also confirms the
prediction that decreasing spreads lead to higher output. As the economy moves from t to t + 4,
bank profits are increasing at a decreasing rate, implying the shadow price of bearing maturity
risk is decreasing and thus spreads are decreasing. That leads to increasing long-term capital
investment and consumption. However, at the time the anticipated shock is known, period 1, bank
profits are expected to be low and increasing sharply forcing the bank to initially charge more for
long-term commitments. Thus, term spreads are high but decreasing.
Note that Adrian et al. (2010a) assess empirically the link between bank’s assets, spreads
and output growth. They propose that lower term spreads, holding riskiness constant, leads to
lower net interest margins, which in turn leads to lower banking asset growth and hence, lower
output. Eectively, this mechanism would occur for movements of spreads that are exogenous
to the bank’s balance sheet decision proposed here, which is based on riskiness. We can obtain
a similar link using our model if we were to alter L (the parameter that controls entrepreneurs
demand for loans given the long-term interest rate - see equation (B.13) in Appendix B). As L
decreases (exogenously), spreads and bank’s long-term asset holdings decrease, leading to lower
22See also Hamilton and Kim (2002).
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le output. Nonetheless, in the framework presented here, endogenous fluctuations of spreads areintrinsically linked to the riskiness of bank’s portfolio or asset holdings, preventing us from fullyanalysing changes in spreads holding riskiness constant, as their mechanism suggests.
3.3. Contemporaneous Shocks and Impulse Responses
In this subsection we look at the dynamic properties of our benchmark model after standard
productivity (technology) and monetary shocks. As previously discussed, the bank portfolio chan-
nel stressed relates to the eect of the future path of profits on term premia. As a result, the key
insight to understand spread movements is not the immediate impact on profits after the shocks
but the expected path of bank profits from period 2 onwards.
Figure 5: Monetary Shock
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We start with a monetary contraction. Figure 5 presents the impulse responses. Output, in-
vestment and consumption decrease as the short-term rate increases. Long-term asset values and
equity returns initially decrease, depressing profits at the time of the shock. Nonetheless, equity
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le returns increase next period and bank profits rebound. As profits are expected to be higher inperiod 2 relative to period 3, the shadow price of the cost of funding decreases and spreads willfall. Profits are expected to fall back and increase towards the steady state from period 3 onwards,
pushing term spreads upward.
Figure 6: Productivity Shock
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Positive technology shocks have the opposite eect (see Figure 6). Output, consumption and
investment all increase. Inflation decreases leading to a decline in the base rate. Bank profits jump
as both long-term assets and equity gain in value. However, as the price of capital decreases from
this period onwards, total equity returns are expected to be lower for the following periods. Hence,
bank profits will be negative and increase from period 2 onwards. As a result, the shadow price of
funding costs increase, pushing term premia up.
In Section 5 we compare the dynamic properties presented here to the impulse responses obtai-
ned from our vector auto-regressive estimations. In general our model does a good job in matching
the empirical correlations. Spreads movements are largely in line with their empirical counterparts
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Our model, by creating a new policy channel, allows us to analyse the impact of unconven-
tional policies during periods of large shocks to liquidity shortages. The Federal Reserve Bank
(FED) conducted two purchase programmes of long-term Treasuries and other long-term bonds,
known as QE1 in 2008-2009 and QE2 in 2010-2011. These QE policies comprised of the pur-
chase of mortgage backed securities, Treasuries and “Agencies” from the private sector. Gagnon
et al. (2011) analyse the eectiveness of the Large-Scale Assets Purchases conducted by the FED.
They find that the purchase programme led to reductions in long-term interest rates on a range of
securities, including some securities that were not included in the purchase programme, indicating
that portfolio balancing eects were in play. They argue that the reductions in interest rates pri-
marily reflect lower risk rather than lower expectations of future short-term rates. Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) find that these QE policies in the US led to a significant decline
in nominal rates on long-term safe assets (Treasuries and “Agencies”, assets which were more
heavily traded by the FED) and only a small eect on less safe assets such as corporate rates and
mortgage rates (assets which were less heavily influenced by FED market activity). Their results
suggest that the eects of asset purchases on the duration of risk premium are small, while eects
on liquidity-safety premium are substantial.
Beirne et al. (2011) report on the eectiveness of the Covered Bond Purchase Programme
(CBPP), which started in July 2009 for a period of twelve months in the Eurozone, and show that
covered bond yields decreased by 12 basis points. They also argue that the programme increased
the liquidity of the secondary market and managed to encourage lending. Joyce et al. (2011) re-
port that the QE interventions in the UK led to a 100 basis point decrease in Gilt yields. They
observe that QE aects other asset classes as well, although the purchase programme has been
overwhelmingly of government securities. Thus, they also highlight the importance of portfo-
lio balancing eects. Finally, Borio and Disyatat (2010) provide a survey of dierent forms of
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ect on long-term
rates through lower term spreads being crucial for the eectiveness of the interventions and for
allowing the financial market to continue funding economic activity.
Two main features of our model are particularly important in formalising these types of inter-
ventions. First, fluctuations in term spreads are relevant factors in determining output fluctuations,
as long-term rates influence investment decisions. Thus, a QE intervention aimed at lowering
long-term rates stimulates economic activity. Second, given that term spreads or long-term rate
decisions are directly determined by fluctuations in future bank profits and changes in their balance
sheet holdings, our model provides a new channel through which these eects arise.23
In order to study the main eects of QE policies we first introduce two types of unconven-
tional monetary policies and then analyse their impact after a liquidity shortage shock. The
first is a simple liquidity injection (QEt) to the bank, financed by a lump-sum tax collected
from households. Liquidity injection, which is costless to the receiving bank, is set such that
QEt = tXL;t 1Pt 1%t, where t = 

X¯L
X¯S
  X˜L;t
X˜S ;t

X¯S
X¯L
and X˜L;t
X˜S ;t
is the ratio of long to short run funding
that would be in place without QE intervention. The liquidity injection is a proportion t of the
bank’s liquidity shortage and its intensity depends on how skewed current investment funding is
towards short-term relative to long-term funding. Note that this relative dierence will be a direct
function of future liquidity conditions.
The second unconventional policy is the existence of favourable conditions for the bank to
borrow funds from the central bank using their long-term asset positions as collateral. Favourable
conditions in our context imply a lower rate of borrowing relative to the short-term funding cur-
rently available. The bank now decides the fraction of long-term assets (t) they want to pledge
as collateral to obtain funds from the central bank. Eectively, at time t, the bank makes a two
period investment. At period t + 1 they sell a portion (t) of these assets to the central bank to
23However, an important caveat, which underlines a promising path for future research, is the fact that our bank
portfolios are fairly simple, with only three assets. They do not include, for instance, housing debt/mortgages, thereby
restricting the analysis of some of the portfolio balancing eects mentioned.
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re2 2t , where Rt;QE is the borrowingrate. The term re2 2t is included such that the marginal cost of this type of funding is increasing
as usage increases.
Note that, although this type of intervention appears to be more complex, since it is implemen-
ted through the market, it requires less information about the bank’s balance sheets by the central
bank. Hence, these types of policies are rather straightforward to implement in practice. In fact, a
significant portion of the QE interventions in the last few years were in that spirit.
The bank’s problem in this case becomes (first order conditions are shown in the Appendix B)
max
fXS ;t ;XL;t ;tgt0
E0
1X
t=0
t
Bt
1 B
1   B (31)
s:t: Dt = PtXS ;t + PtXL;t + Zt + Pt 1XL;t 1   tXL;t 1Pt 1
where
Bt+1 =
1
Pt+1
h
TREt+1 + (RL;t 1   1)Pt 1XL;t 1 + (RS ;t   1)PtXS ;t   Dt(RS ;t   1)  
 %t+1XL;tPt+1 + XL;tPtVt+1;t   tXL;t 1Pt 1(RQE;t   1)   QE2 
2
t
i
: (32)
Finally, we assume the central bank sets RQE;t = RS ;t

1   re

X¯L
X¯S
  X˜L;t
X˜S ;t

X¯S
X¯L

. Thus, the lower
the long-term funding relative to short-term without intervention, the more favourable central bank
funding will be.
Figure 7 illustrates the results for a liquidity shock of 0.02 with  = 4:5, QE = 0:005 and
re = 0:15. That means the central bank covers roughly 80% of the liquidity shortage under the
first intervention after the shock and, in the second case, buys roughly 75% of long-term assets
from the bank’s balance sheets (see the bottom left graph in Figure 7).
We first look at the eect of a liquidity shock without the presence of unconventional po-
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licies (depicted by impulse responses with a circle). The shock first leads to a sharp increase in
long-term rates and spreads. As a result, long-term investment drops significantly reducing output.
Conventional monetary policy works overtime, reducing the base-rate substantially sustaining out-
put through consumption. After a few periods, the base rate starts returning to its steady state level
and lower capital stock due to the low investment in the previous periods materialises. Output,
then, declines further reaching its lowest point two years after the shock. Note that conventional
policies are quite important to sustain output in the immediate periods after the shock. This as-
sumes nominal rates can be decreased.24 If however, rates are at a lower point at the time of the
shock and conventional policies cannot be eectively used, the liquidity shock may have a larger
impact.
When unconventional policies are used we see a dierent pattern. We observe that both QE
policies do have a significant impact on term spreads. These policies lead to dampened responses
24The zero bound is not reached in our simulations.
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le of long-term investment and output relative to the case where only conventional monetary policyis used. Both types of QE interventions are equally ecient in stabilising the economy, showingthat market interventions are a good alternative to basic liquidity provisions which by design aim
directly to neutralise the disturbances but are much harder to implement in practice. As uncon-
ventional policies are used conventional interventions become less important with the policy rate
decreasing only mildly. In other words, while we do not model the nominal zero bound restric-
tion, our calibrations show that short rates variations are minimal, indicating that after such shocks
unconventional policy clearly dominates conventional policy. An important result is that inflation
turns out to be significantly higher after QE interventions. Thus, even if nominal rates are close to
1, QE interventions could lead to lower real rates.
The channel through which these interventions aect our model economy also highlights how
central bank programmes of buying long-term government bonds and selling short-term bonds
(e.g. “Operation Twist”) could impact the yield curve. In oering the banks the possibility to ex-
change long-term commitments to shorter term assets, the central bank eectively allows financial
institutions to decrease their exposure to maturity transformation risk. As a result, banks may
decrease the premia they require to continue providing long-term funding, depressing long-term
yields.
One of the important debates in policy making is about the timing of unwinding the large-
scale purchases. Although not completely suited to provide a definite answer to such a question,
we can use our model to verify the eectiveness of short-term asset purchase agreements, which
sell securities back to banks after one period, and the interventions that allow banks to move
long-term assets away from balance sheets for longer periods. In order to do that we modify the
model such that long-term investments now require one year (four quarters) commitments from
entrepreneurs and hence from banks. Appendix D shows the details of the model and each of
the two QE interventions: one period asset purchases and three periods asset purchases. Figure
8 displays our results.25 We set QE and re for each of these two interventions such that the
25Impulse responses for long-term capital stock are shown after the fourth period since that is the point changes to
long-term investment done at time t = 1 start having eects.
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le discount rates are the same and the portion of long-term assets bought by the central bank arematched (roughly 40% in the first period, see graph at the bottom left corner).
Figure 8: Short versus Long-term Asset Purchases
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We observe that when the central bank holds assets for longer periods, the same intervention
in terms of assets purchases leads to lower levels of term spreads/long-term yields and to a smaller
decline in long-term investments after a liquidity shock. There is a gain for the central bank to hold
the securities bought in such interventions for longer periods of time, since they are more eective
in freeing up the bank’s balance sheet, amplifying their eect on long-term funding. Obviously,
these securities remain in the central bank balance sheet for longer and thus the monetary authority
is taking significantly more risks than when it keeps securities for only one period.
5. Empirical Evidence
As argued in the introduction there is strong evidence that US term spreads help to predict US
real output growth (see, for instance, Rudebusch and Williams (2009)). Furthermore, Adrian et al.
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le (2010b) highlight the importance of financial sector variables, particularly the growth in financialintermediary asset holdings, in predicting several asset prices and risk measures. Finally, Kurmannand Otrok (forthcoming) establish a link between changes in the slope of the yield curve and news
on total factor productivity. We complement this macro empirical evidence by looking particularly
at the linkages between financial sector profitability, term spreads and output growth. For this pur-
pose we conduct three sets of empirical analyses. We start by analysing the microeconometric
link between the changes in the expected bank profitability at the bank level and the evolution in
term spreads. Second, given the importance of the expected forward looking path of profits in
explaining term spreads movements we look at the response of the main economic variables to
anticipated innovations (news) to banking profitability as identified using the methodology deve-
loped by Barsky and Sims (2011) (adapted from Uhlig (2003)). These two sets of estimations aim
at testing whether the theoretical channel we present is reflected in the data. Third, we employ
a standard VAR to look at the impulse responses to contemporaneous productivity and monetary
shocks, and a VAR in levels to analyse the eect of a consumer expectations shock, which is used
as a proxy to changes in expected productivity growth, following Barsky and Sims (2012) closely.
These VAR evidence is largely used to assess whether the broad empirical contours are in line
with the dynamic properties of the theoretical model.
5.1. Spreads and Expected Financial Business Profitability: Bank Level Evidence
Our main theoretical mechanism postulates that as expected profits at time t + 1 increase
spreads at time t tend to decrease. The opposite occurs when expected profits decrease. In this
subsection we investigate whether there is empirical support for our claims.
The theoretical measure of profits includes both cash flows or net interest rate earnings and
capital gains or book value changes. An equivalent measure of profits at the micro-level, which
includes both net interest gains and book value changes, is the bank’s total earning per share. This
restricts our sample to banks with publicly traded equities. We thus select the financial companies
in the S&P 500. In order to obtain a measure of expected profits we use the forecast of earnings
per share as reported by Thomson-Reuters I/B/E/S. We convert the information into quarterly
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le frequency26 for the period of 1990Q1 and 2007Q2, obtaining a dataset of 22 large US financialinstitutions for which we have longer time series data available.27 We define the changes in theexpected profitability (mean expected earnings per share) as
Et 1Bi;t =

Et 1(EPS )i;t   EPS i;t 1
Et 2(EPS )i;t 1   EPS i;t 2 (33)
The remaining data used consists of seasonally adjusted US real GDP expressed in billions of
chained 2005 Dollars (y), term spreads (spread), computed using the eective Federal Funds rate
( f f r) in percent per annum as reported by the US Federal Reserve and ten year government bond
rate in percent per annum.  is annualised quarterly inflation rate calculated from the CPI index
(P) as reported by the IMF/IFS.
We estimate the following unbalanced fixed (cross-section) eects panel data specification
given by
spreadt = i + TS (spreadt 1) + y (yt 1) +  (t 1) + 

Et 1Bi;t

+ "i;t (34)
While we report estimation results based on the model with cross-section weights/panel cor-
rected standard errors and covariance, we also estimate the model with specifications that account
for various patterns of correlation between the residuals (Robust Coecient Covariances). Our
results are not aected by the specification of basic variance structures. We report four main es-
timations (Table 1): first an OLS estimation without controlling for the changes in the expected
banking profitability; second a panel data estimation that controls for the expected banking profi-
tability (benchmark); third the same panel including short-term interest rates ( f f r) as additional
control; and finally the benchmark panel with data extended until 2011Q2 to verify the sensitivity
26Given that there are more than one forecast done in each quarter we take a simple average of these, hence obtaining
a mean forecast for the quarter.
27They are: JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM), Chubb Corp (CHUBB), Lincoln National Corp (LINCOLN), Marsh and
McLennan Cos (MARSH), PNC Financial Services Group Inc (PNC), Suntrust Banks Inc (SUN), Torchmark Corp
(TORCH), Loews Corp (LOEWS), Morgan Stanley (MS), Comerica Inc (COMER), Fifth Third Bancorp (5TH), Pro-
gressive Corp-Ohio (PROG), Huntington Bancshares (HUNTING), Northern Trust Corp (NORTH), Franklin Resources
Inc (FRANK), Equity Residential (EQRESID), Goldman Sachs (GOLDMAN), Prudential Financial Inc (PRUD),
Apartment Inv and Mgmt (APINV), Federated Investors Inc (FED), Ameriprise Financial Inc (AMFIN) and Cincinnati
Financial Corp (CINNFIN).
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le Table 1: Pooled (EGLS) Estimation Results - Spreads and Future Expected ProfitsOLS Pooled EGLS
1990Q1-2007Q2 1990Q1-2011Q2
Coe. p   val Coe. p   val Coe. p   val Coe. p   val
spreadt 1 .94 .00 .94 .00 .89 .00 .91 .00
yt 1 -.08 .00 -.08 .00 -.08 .00 -.06 .00
t 1 -.13 .00 -.15 .00 -.15 .00 -.10 .00
Et 1Bi;t -.14 .03 -.13 .03 -.07 .01
f f rt 1 -.04 .00
R2=n:o: .85 / 70 .86 / 1124 .86 / 1124 .87 / 1388
of our results to the inclusion of the credit crunch period. We start by looking at the comparison
between the simple OLS and the benchmark panel results (second block column). We observe
that expected increases in the bank profitability leads to a statistically significant decline in term
spreads. Furthermore, the coecient for Et 1Bi;t is economically significant. A marginal in-
crease in the growth rate of earnings per share leads to a decline in term spreads by about 14 basis
points. These results provide indirect support to the theoretical bank portfolio channel we propose.
As we show when banks expect higher profitability in the forthcoming period, the shadow price
of funding costs decrease, leading to a decrease in term spreads. Furthermore, although we focus
on the aggregate channel we observe a large degree of heterogeneity across financial institutions,
fixed eects ranging from -.20 to .03 (these are not reported here).
We perform two robustness exercises. First, we include the base interest rate (federal funds
rate) as an additional regressor. Spreads become less persistent, the coecient on interest rates
is significant, but most importantly, expected bank profitability remain both statistically and eco-
nomically significant. Second, we extend the sample period to include the recent financial crisis
(up to 2011Q2); we find that the coecient of growth in expected profits decreases by 50% but
remains statistically significant (it becomes significant at 1% confidence level).
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changes in the expected banking profitability, term spreads and other key macroeconomic va-
riables. Recent research such as Barsky and Sims (2011) and Kurmann and Otrok (forthcoming)
uses a modification to Uhlig’s (2003) method to identify total factor productivity (TFP) news as the
innovation that explains most of the forecast error variance (FEV) of TFP over a ten year horizon
but is orthogonal to contemporaneous TFP movements. Using this identification scheme Barsky
and Sims (2011) show that a TFP news shock can explain over 40% of US business cycle variations
over a ten year horizon. Kurmann and Otrok (forthcoming) also employ the same identification
but look at the link between TFP news and variations in the slope of the US yield curve.
Given that our interest is to uncover a relationship between spreads and expected bank profits,
we employ the same empirical strategy to extract the innovation (news) that explains most of the
FEV of bank profitability but is orthogonal to its contemporaneous innovation. Following these
contributions closely, we set up a VAR in levels utilising quarterly US data covering the period
1970Q1-2007Q2. Our data consists of the same GDP (y), interest rate ( f f r), spread and price (P)
measures used in the previous analysis plus seasonally adjusted gross private domestic investment
(I) as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In order to incorporate a variable that reflects
future news about the evolution of economic activity (see Barsky and Sims (2012) for details) we
also include the index derived from a five years forward looking question on confidence from the
Michigan Index of Consumer Expectations, which we denote E5Y .28
Finally, we include a measure of bank profits using the actual earnings per share for the 204
major financial institutions included in S&P 1500 as reported by Compustat.29 We calculate an
aggregate measure of financial business profitability (B) using the changes in actual earnings
28The actual question is “Turning to economic conditions in the country as a whole, do you expect that over the next
five years we will have mostly good times, or periods of widespread unemployment and depression, or what?” The
variable is then constructed as being the percentage giving a positive answer minus the percentage giving a negative
answer plus one hundred. For further discussion see Barsky and Sims (2012). They suggest that the correlation of this
confidence measure is at least over 85% with alternative questions along similar dimensions.
29More financial institutions are included here relative to the panel estimation in Section 5.1 since suciently long
time series data of actual EPS is readily available while data on EPS forecasts is available only for a limited sample of
financial institutions.
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i=1
 
EPS i;t   EPS i;t 1EPS i;t 1 ; (35)
where i indexes financial firms in our sample after adjusting for outliers.31 Detailed data descrip-
tions are provided in Appendix A. The moving average VAR representation is given by
zt = B(L)ut; (36)
where ut is a vector of reduced form errors and z
0
t =
h
Bt ; E5Yt; spreadt; It; yt; Pt; f f rt
i
.
The variable of interest is Bt . Based on the identification proposed by Barsky and Sims
(2011) we assume bank profitability can be decomposed into two uncorrelated innovations "currentt
and "newst , such that
Bt = v(L)"
current
t + d(L)"
news
t ; (37)
where v(L) and d(L) are lag polynomials with the restriction that d(0) = 0. This provides the key
distinction between the two innovations allowing the second to be related to an anticipated or news
component. As standard one can assume there is a relationship between reduced form errors (ut)
and fundamental shocks ("t), such that ut = A"t, and thus the structural moving average represen-
tation of the VAR is given by zt = B(L)A"t = C(L)"t. Matrix A must satisfy AA0 = , where 
is the variance covariance matrix of innovations, and is not unique. Thus, starting from any per-
missible matrix A (we select a simple Choleski decomposition) one can then obtain an alternative
impact matrix AQ, where Q is an orthogonal matrix. Using a VAR with bank profitability ordered
first, the identification method selects a column q of Q that maximises the FEV of bank profitabi-
30Our bottom-up measure of financial profitability (B) based on actual earnings per share is preferred to financial
business undistributed corporate profits (FBP), as reported by the Flow of Funds Statistics of the US Federal Reserve,
since the former measure is directly associated with the expected earnings per share used in the pervious section. As
reported by the US Federal Reserve, FBP is part of the distribution of national income and includes inventory (book-
value) valuations as does our EPS measure. Our EPS measure closely reflects the concept of banking profits used in
the theoretical model that not only reflects cash flows but also changes in the market value of assets.
31Bt is calculated excluding the financial firms with the highest and the lowest EPS change for each quarter.
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le Figure 9: Impulse Responses to News on Bank Profitabilityy
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lity over a ten year horizon subject to q0q = 1 and q(1) = 0. The last constraint ensures that the
innovation identified does not impact bank profits contemporaneously. Thus, the application of
this method produces an approximation to the innovation "newst . The structural impulse responses
to the bank profitability news shock are then given by B(L)Aq. The share of FEV of a variable i at
horizon h attributed to this news shock is 
i = (
Ph
=0 BiAqq
0A0B0i)=(
Ph
=0 BiB
0
i), where Bi
denotes the ith row of the matrix of moving average coecients.32
Figure 9 presents impulse responses of output, bank profitability, spread and interest rate to
the bank profitability news shock.33 We note that short term rates increase and spreads decline
upon impact of the news on the future profitability. The negative co-movement between spreads
and expected banking profitability result is the key implication in our theoretical model and is
consistent with the microeconometric evidence presented in the previous subsection.34 We also
32See Barsky and Sims (2011) for more details.
33Confidence bands are calculated as suggested by Kilian (1998).
34The negative co-movement between spreads and expected banking profitability is robust to extending the sample to
include the recent financial crisis (1970Q1-2010Q2). Note that while real output also follows a hump-shaped response
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le obtain the share of FEV for each variable that is attributable to the news shocks over a twentyquarters horizon. The news shock explains 5% of the movements in spreads, 23% of variationsin investment, around 17% of variations in real GDP, 4% of variations in the CPI and about 33%
of variations in consumer expectations. Given that most variations in spreads are attributable
to shocks in spreads (75%), the contribution of the news shock to spreads FEV appears to be
nontrivial.
A necessary caveat on these results is in order. The decomposition of bank profitability into a
contemporaneous and a news component as uncorrelated innovations works well when the variable
is exogenous. Bank profits are clearly endogenous in the short-run and hence the identification of
the news component might reflect this endogeneity. The strong link between the identified inno-
vation (news) and consumer expectations together with the hump-shaped response of output to
this innovation indicate that the bank profitability news might be related to overall news about
economic activity. Nonetheless, results clearly reveal a negative correlation between anticipa-
ted movements in bank profits and term spreads and corroborate the microeconometric evidence
previously presented.
5.3. VAR estimations
In the previous two subsections we have presented statistical evidence of a relation between
expected banking profitability at the micro and macro-levels and term spreads. Here, as a final
set of empirical support to our model and by utilising a VAR framework, we assess the impact of
various shocks on term spreads and other macroeconomic variables at the aggregate level. Our
aim is to verify whether the dynamic properties of our theoretical model are in line with their em-
pirical counterparts. Firstly, we look at a case that attempts to capture the eects of an anticipated
productivity shock by analysing the impact of a shock on consumer expectations. Secondly, des-
pite the fact that our theoretical channel is forward looking in nature, given that contemporaneous
shocks aect the future path of bank profits, we also analyse the dynamic properties of the main
economic variables after a monetary and a real output shock.
in this extended sample, it declines upon the impact of the shock and recovers thereafter.
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le In order to study the impact of monetary, real output and consumer expectations shocks, wefollow the identification structure of Christiano et al. (1999). The VAR specification is given by
zt = B(L)ut; (38)
where z0t =
h
x01t; $
0
t ; x02t
i
. $t is a ( j1) vector of the variables of interest, consisting of f f f rt, ytg for
monetary and real output shocks in the VAR in dierences and fE5Ytg for consumer expectations
shocks in the VAR in levels. Note that x1t is a (k11) vector with elements whose contemporaneous
and lagged values influence the variables of interest at time t and x2t is a (k2  1) vector with
elements whose only values are aected by an innovation to the variables of interest at time t.
Finally, ut is a (k  1) vector of reduced form errors with k = k1 + j + k2: As before, we are
interested in obtaining the impact matrix A¯ linking reduced form errors (ut) to fundamental shocks
("t) such that ut = A¯"t. We, thus, assume that A¯ has a block triangular structure with zero in its
upper diagonal as in Christiano et al. (1999).
For our benchmark analysis we assume x1t is empty, thus the variable of interest is ordered
first, being unaected by the other variables contemporaneously. For robustness we also estimate
the model with all variables in x1t and x2t empty. Finally, the estimation of the benchmark case
assumes a four-lags structure to capture sucient dynamics in the system. We focus on the impulse
responses to a shock on the variable of interest (monetary, real output or consumer expectations)
and calculate the one standard error bias-corrected bootstrap confidence bands as suggested by
Kilian (1998). Our benchmark specification for all VAR estimation covers the period 1970Q1-
2007Q2. As robustness checks we also run estimations for the period of 1970Q1 to 2010Q2
including the recent financial crisis and for the 1985Q1 to 2007Q2 focusing on the period after the
Volcker disinflation. Results do not change qualitatively and hence we only report the benchmark
estimation results.35
35We also estimate the VARs with FBP instead of EPS to check for robustness. The dynamic responses do not change
significantly.
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le 5.3.1. Consumer Expectations ShocksBeaudry and Portier (2004; 2006) propose business cycle models where consumers become
aware of changes in future productivity that is uncorrelated to current productivity. Barsky and
Sims (2012) show that these shocks to consumer expectations are not Granger caused by income
or consumption and help to predict long lasting variations in consumption and real output. Thus,
innovations on consumer expectations can be characterised as noisy measures of changes in ex-
pected productivity growth, serving as a proxy to study the eect of news on productivity, which
is the focus of this subsection. We follow their contribution closely and set up the VAR with
z0t =
h
E5Yt; x
0
2t
i
with x02t =
h
Bt ; spreadt; It; yt; Pt; f f rt
i
. Thus, the variable of interest is consu-
mer expectations (E5Y) and the variables in x2t are respectively, financial business profitability
(B), term spreads (spread), real investment (I, in logs), real GDP (y, in logs), CPI (P, in logs)
and the Federal Funds rate ( f f r).
The upper panel of Figure 10 shows impulse responses to shocks to our consumer expectations
measure.36 After a positive consumer expectations shock, spreads respond as the model predicts;
they increase on impact and decrease as output increases, reaching their minimum level as out-
put peaks, establishing the countercyclical term spreads result. Financial business profitability as
measured by variations in actual earnings per share responds positively followed by a decline and
then follows a hump-shaped pattern. As expected, both investment and real output also follow a
hump-shaped pattern. Fed Funds rate appears to accommodate the inflationary pressures that are
being built up in the real economy. Spreads are very persistent and the variance decomposition of
the spread fluctuations shows that 75% of its variation is explained by its own shocks.37 Invest-
ment and the Federal Funds rate explain around 6% while GDP and bank profits explain around
4% of spreads FEV.
36Barsky and Sims (2012) report similar results in a five variable VAR that studies E5Y, consumption, real output,
real rates and inflation. We also estimate a VAR model with consumption, instead of investment, results are largely
unchanged.
37Results reported are for a five period horizon; the decompositions follow a similar pattern for longer horizons.
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le The empirical impulse responses shown above are closely matched by the ones obtained fromour theoretical model after a one year ahead anticipated shock (see Section 3.2). Spreads initiallyincrease, with investment pushing output up. As economic conditions improve with output and
bank profits increasing, spreads tend to fall, reaching the lowest point as the economy reaches
the peak of the business cycle and converging back to steady state thereafter. As in the data,
investment, output and bank profitability follow a hump-shaped pattern.
The eects of an anticipated productivity shock (or more precisely news on TFP) is analysed
by Kurmann and Otrok (forthcoming). They find that the main driver of fluctuations in the slope
of the term structure is news about future innovations to TFP. They report that term spreads in-
crease after a news shock, while real rates decrease, matching the results presented here.38 They
decompose the responses of the slope of the term structure after a TFP news shock and show that
two thirds is explained by movements in expected future short-term rates and one third by time
variation in term spreads. They, thus, conclude that monetary policy plays an important role in
determining movements in the yield curve. Our theoretical model attempts to highlight a channel
through which these movements in term spreads occur in response to news about future economic
activity that aect the future path of bank profits. Hence, although acknowledging its importance,
our focus is on the additional drivers that are not directly related to monetary policy. The nega-
tive correlation observed between expected profitability and the slope of the yield curve obtained
in Section 5.2 gives indirect support to the bank portfolio mechanism as one explanation for the
observed variation in term spreads.
5.3.2. Monetary Policy Shock
In order to study the impact of monetary and real output shocks, we order the VAR with
z0t =
h
f f rt;yt; x
0
2t
i
and with x02t =
h
Bt ; spreadt;It; t
i
: These assumptions mean that i) x1t
is empty, ii) f f r does not respond contemporaneously to other shocks and real GDP contempo-
raneously responds only to the Federal Funds rate. We also check for robustness with respect to
38Note that their spread movements are more persistent than the ones reported here, which might indicate that using
a TFP series to extract the news component provides a better identification than using a contemporaneous innovation to
consumer expectations.
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le alternative orderings.The middle panel in Figure 10 displays impulse responses to a one standard deviation mone-tary policy shock. We first note that a positive monetary policy shock leads to an instantaneous,
statistically significant sharp decline in earnings per share (Bt ) as predicted by our model in
Section 3.3 and confirming den Haan et al. (2007) findings on the eects of a monetary policy
shock on bank equity. Second, spreads immediately decrease significantly, recovering smoothly
thereafter. Real investment, output and inflation respond as expected. As a robustness check we
also estimate the VAR with an alternative ordering where x2t is empty and all variables other than
f f rt populate x1t:We note that our results are not aected by this alternative assumption.
The impulse responses after a monetary shock in our theoretical model show a similar pattern
to the empirical ones obtained from the unrestricted VAR. Both output and bank profits fall, with
bank profits bouncing back and becoming positive soon after the shock. Although the model is
able to account for the fall in spreads at the period when the shock occurs, the empirical results
also show that spreads actually fall persistently, while in the theoretical model they become posi-
tive after the first period. Recall that the main motivation for looking at financial intermediation
as a driver of spread movements was to uncover an additional channel that may work in parallel
to the key component that is already identified in the literature, namely, inflation expectations or
inflation risk. As Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2010) show monetary policy changes may influence infla-
tion risk and expectations, which after a contractionary intervention tend to fall, depressing term
spreads. Adding this element to our model could help in delivering a persistent decline in spreads
as observed in the data.
5.3.3. Real Output Shock
The lower panel in Figure 10 shows impulse responses with respect to a positive one standard
deviation shock to real output. While we do not attempt to identify the nature of the real output
shock (demand or supply) our results suggest that the pattern of empirical impulse responses tends
to match the behaviour of the impulse responses with respect to a contemporaneous technology
shock as depicted in Section 3.3. We find that spreads initially increase significantly. That is
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le followed by a steady decline eventually turning negative and recovering thereafter. The maindistinction is that the theoretical model is unable to replicate the amplitude of the fall in spreadsafter period 3.
Perhaps not surprisingly, a positive real output shock is associated with an instantaneous in-
crease in both real investment and real GDPwhich takes about 8 quarters to stabilise while inflation
declines. As a robustness check to the ordering of variables, we alternatively assume that i) va-
riables other than yt are populating x1t; thus x2t is empty and ii) f f rt is ordered right after yt
instead of being before. Our qualitative results are not aected significantly by these alternative
assumptions. Finally, we observe that more than 90% of the FEV in spreads in the VAR in dif-
ferences (which was used to identify both monetary and real output shocks) is explained by the
short term interest rate and the spread’s own shocks. Each of the other variables (GDP, investment,
inflation and bank profitability) account individually for less then 3% of the fluctuations.
Overall, the empirical impulse responses of spreads are more persistent than the ones from
the theoretical model after contemporaneous shocks. The main reason is that in our model asset
prices move sharply in the current period returning very smoothly back to the steady state. We
modify the theoretical model in two ways to explore its ability to generate more persistent spread
movements. Firstly, we assume long-term assets lasting for four periods and secondly, we allow
for variable capital utilisation.39 In both cases we obtain more persistent spread movements. The
main downside is that spreads are then less volatile to news shocks since asset prices do not
move as sharply. We conjecture that other mechanisms that generate greater propagation in asset
prices during the subsequent periods after a shock (e.g. incorporating learning) may lead to more
persistent spread responses as they potentially have greater impact on the future path of bank
profits.
39Results for these model extensions are available from the authors upon request.
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le 6. ConclusionsFluctuations in term spreads have relevant implications for macroeconomic outcomes and may
predict output growth. Undoubtedly, inflation expectations or more generally long-term inflation
risks are important determinants of these fluctuations. However, the observation that nominal and
real yield curves move together in many instances suggests that other factors are in play. We
propose a model that delivers endogenous variations in term spreads driven primarily by changes
in banks’ portfolio decision and their appetite to bear the risk of maturity transformation. We
show that fluctuations in future profitability of banks’ portfolio aect their ability to cover for any
liquidity needs and hence influence the premium they require to carry maturity risk.
While we present a model in which bank portfolios are fairly simple, we are able to match
important features of the data. Our model suggests that factors predominantly external to mone-
tary policy may contribute not only to the marginal predictive power of spreads but also to the
understanding of the linkages between banks, spread movements and the macroeconomy.
Embedding this banking sector framework into a DSGE model allows us to analyse the in-
teraction between spread movements and unconventional policies. Unconventional policies are
shown to have a strong impact on spread movements fomenting long-term investment and helping
reduce output losses after negative liquidity shocks, matching the general view on the eects of
recent asset purchases programmes. Next, we show that asset purchases programmes that keep
the assets in the central bank’s balance sheet for longer are more eective in osetting a liquidity
shock. These policy measures allow the central bank to restore short-term rates to steady state le-
vels more quickly. This result supports the ECB’s decision to intervene in the market and hold the
assets purchased under the CBPP programme until maturity. Finally, we complement the theore-
tical analysis with empirical evidence confirming the link between expected banking profitability
and terms spreads.
Bank portfolio choices and balance sheet conditions matter in determining risk premia in the
macroeconomy. Further research looking at constraints on risk taking and trading of instruments
that allows banks to manage balance sheet exposures such as asset backed securities and collatera-
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le lised funding may improve our understanding of their importance. More specifically, the presentwork highlights at least three areas in which future projects, exploring the role of bank’s portfo-lio decisions in aecting risk premia and the macroeconomy, may be fruitful. First, increasing
the complexity of banks’ portfolios will provide a better understanding of this important channel,
most notably, including (workers) housing investment funded by financial intermediation. That
would mean fluctuations in term spreads would not only influence investment but also consump-
tion, potentially amplifying the eects of spread movements, since as we observe, consumption
and investment move in opposite directions compensating each other. Moreover, including other
long-term asset classes may potentially allow us to study portfolio balancing eects after QE inter-
ventions. Second, making liquidity shortages endogenous based on the potential for securitisation
of long-term assets may be crucial to fully understand those factors behind spread movements
and their marginal predictive power. Finally, final investors’ (after securitisation) and banks’ risk
assessment could also be time varying aecting the linkage between long-term funding risks and
economic activity.
Appendix A. Data
This Appendix provides a description of the data used in the empirical study.
 Treasury Bill Rate (Units: Percent per Annum), (Series ID: 60C..ZF ), Source: International
Financial Statistics/IMF.
 Federal Funds Eective Rate (H15/H15/RIFSPFF N.M), Source: US Federal Reserve.
 Government Bond Yield: 10 year (Units: Percent per Annum), (Series ID: 61...ZF ), Source:
International Financial Statistics/IMF.
 CPI All Items City Average (Units: Index Number), (Series ID: 64...ZF ), Source: Interna-
tional Financial Statistics/IMF.
 Real Gross Domestic Product, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate , (Series ID: GDPC96),
Source: US Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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le  Gross Private Domestic Investment, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, (Table 5.1.),Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
 Financial Business; undistributed corporate profits excluding CCAdj, (FOF Code: FA796006403.Q),
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.
 Earnings Per Share (Basic) - Excluding Extraordinary Items, Source: Compustat.
 Expected Earnings Per Share, Meanest, Source: Thomson/Reuters I/B/E/S.
 E5Y, Michigan Index of Consumer Expectations.
Appendix B. Equilibrium Conditions and Steady State
The household maximisation routines yield the following equilibrium conditions
Et
 C t+1
t+1
!
=
C t
Rt;CB
(B.1)
and
w j;t =
"w
"w   1
Et
P1
s=0
C t+s
C t
(!w)s
Ht+s
C t+s
Ht+s

Et
P1
s=0
C t+s
C t
(!w)sHt+s
Qs
k=1 t+k
 1 : (B.2)
This equation can be conveniently expressed in recursive form as such
0 = f w1;t
w
w   1   f
w
2;tw j;t;
f w1;t = Ht
Ht
C t
+ Et
"
!w
C t+1
C t
f w1;t+1
#
;
f w2;t = Ht + Et
"
!w
C t+1
C t
 1t+1 f
w
2;t+1
#
;
where, w j;t = W j;t=Pt and wt = Wt=Pt, is given by
w1 "wt = (1   !w)w1 "wj;t + !ww"w 1t 1 : (B.3)
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s using the household’s stochastic dis-count factor given by Qt;t+1 = Et  C t+1
t+1C t
!
=
1
RCB;t
:
Given that the purpose of our analysis is not to look at the eects of firm-specific capital we
assume that there exists a capital market within firms. That way all intermediate firms will have
the same labour-capital ratio and t;i = t for all i, as in the case where a capital rental market is
available. The net aggregate investment in (new) capital is then acquired from entrepreneurs. Note
that, as shown by Sveen and Weinke (2007), the relevant dierence of considering firm-specific
capital is that the parameter on the marginal cost in the Phillips curve would be lower, increasing
eective price stickiness. Our results are not qualitatively aected by this change.
Based on that, pi;t is determined by solving the price setting maximisation, substituting for the
stochastic discount factor and using t+s;i = t+s. That gives
pi;t =
"
"   1
Et
P1
s=0
C t+s
C t
(!)st+sYt+s
Qs
k=1 t+k
"
Et
P1
s=0
C t+s
C t
(!)sYt+s
Qs
k=1 t+k
" 1 : (B.4)
The recursive formulation is given by
0 = f1;t

   1   f2;tpi;t;
f1;t = Ytt + Et
"
!
C t+1
C t
t+1 f1;t+1
#
;
f2;t = Yt + Et
"
!
C t+1
C t
 1t+1 f2;t+1
#
;
where, pi;t = Pi;t=Pt and t = Pt=Pt 1, is given by
1 = (1   !)p1 "i;t + !" 1t : (B.5)
From the firm cost minimisation problem we obtain the demand for capital and labour. After
rearranging the first order conditions and substituting for the stochastic discount factor Qt;t+1, we
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Yt = AtKSt

KLt
(1 )
H1 t ; (B.6)
t =
wtHt
Yt(1   ) ; (B.7)
qSt = Et
8>><>>: C t+1t+1C t
2666664t+1Yt+1KSt+1 + (1   )qSt+1
3777775
9>>=>>; ; and (B.8)
qLt = Et
8>><>>: C t+1t+1C t
266664t+1(1   )Yt+1
KLt+1
+ (1   )qLt+1
3777759>>=>>; . (B.9)
Using the capital aggregation conditions, investment evolves according to
ISt = K
S
t+1   (1   )KSt ; and (B.10)
ILt = K
L
t+1   (1   )KLt : (B.11)
From entrepreneurs maximisation problems we obtain
XS ;t =
S Et(qSt+1t+1)
RS ;t
  1; and (B.12)
XL;t =
LEt(qLt+2t+1t+2)
RL;t
  1: (B.13)
Finally, from the bank maximisation problem we have that
RS ;t = Rt;CB; and (B.14)
Et
"
Bt+1
 B
 
Rt;CB   1   Vt+1;t
t+1
+ %t+1
!#
= Et
2666664Bt+2 Bt+1t+2 (RL;t   Rt+1;CB)
3777775 (B.15)
where
40Once again we have used the fact that marginal costs are the same across intermediate firms.
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le Bt = TREtPt + (Rt 2;L   1)tt 1 XL;t 2+ (Rt 1;CB   1)t  XS ;t 1   Dt 1Pt 1 ! %tXL;t 1+ XL;t 1Vt;t 1t ; (B.16)
TREt
Pt
= Yt   wtHt   qSt ISt   qLt ILt
+qSt K
S
t+1 + q
L
t K
L
t+1  
qSt 1K
S
t + q
L
t 1K
L
t
t
; (B.17)
Dt
Pt
= XS ;t + XL;t +
(qSt 1K
S
t + q
L
t 1K
L
t )
t
+
XL;t 1
t
; and (B.18)
Vt+1;t =
RL;t
RS ;t
  Et[%t+1]
RS ;t+1
: (B.19)
We define the term spreads (annual rate in percentage points) between long and short-term rate
as
tpt =
1
2

(RL;t   1)   (Rt;CB   1)   (Rt+1;CB   1) 400: (B.20)
Finally, the central bank sets monetary policy according to
Rt;CB
R¯CB
=
"
t
¯
 Yt
Y¯
Y #
; (B.21)
where X¯ is the steady state value of Xt. This is the standard monetary rule whereby the base rate
responds to deviations in inflation and output. The recursive equilibrium is determined as the
solution to equations (22)-(24) and (B.1) - (B.21).
Steady State From pricing equation (normalising prices at steady state to 1) we have that
 =
   1

: (B.22)
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w   1
H¯
C¯ 
: (B.23)
From the intermediate firm problem we have that
 =
w¯H¯
Y¯(1   ) ; (B.24)
q¯s =
Y¯
K¯S [1   (1   )] ; and (B.25)
q¯L =
(1   )Y¯
K¯L[1   (1   )] : (B.26)
From entrepreneurs problems we have that
X¯S = S q¯S   1; and (B.27)
X¯L =
Lq¯L
RL
  1: (B.28)
From the bank problem we have that
 
1

  1
!
+ % = 
 
RL   1

!
or RL =
1
2
+
%

: (B.29)
The term spread at the steady state is given by
¯tp =
1
2
[(RL   1)   (1=   1)   (1=   1)]400: (B.30)
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Y¯ = H¯(1 )K¯S K¯
(1 )
L ; (B.32)
K¯S = S ln(1 + X¯S ); and (B.33)
K¯L = L ln(1 + X¯L): (B.34)
Unconventional Monetary Policy - Benchmark Model
The bank’s problem under the unconventional monetary policy with Repo of Long-term Assets
is
max
fXS ;t ;XL;t ;tgt0
E0
1X
t=0
t
Bt
1 B
1   B (B.35)
s:t: Dt = PtXS ;t + PtXL;t + Zt + Pt 1XL;t 1   tXL;t 1Pt 1
where
Bt+1 =
1
Pt+1
h
TREt+1 + (RL;t 1   1)Pt 1XL;t 1 + (RS ;t   1)PtXS ;t   Dt(RS ;t   1)  
 %t+1XL;tPt+1 + XL;tPtVt+1;t   tXL;t 1Pt 1(RQE;t   1)   QE2 
2
t
i
:
(B.36)
The first order conditions in this case are
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le RS ;t = Rt;CB; (B.37)
Bt+1
 B
"
(RS ;t   RQE;t)XL;t 1
tt+1
  QEt
#
= 0; and (B.38)
Et
(
Bt+1
 B
"
(RS ;t   1)   Vt+1;t
t+1
+ %t+1
#)
= Et
(
Bt+2
 B
t+1t+2
[RL;t   Rt+1;CB +
+t+1(RS ;t+1   RQE;t+1)]
)
:
(B.39)
Appendix C. Second Order Approximation of Long-term Rate Deci-
sion
The bank equilibrium condition is given by41
Et
266666664

Bt+1
 B
+1
 
RCB;t   1   Vt+1;t + %˜t+1
377777775 = Et
266666664

Bt+2
 B
+1+2
(RL;t   RCB;t+1)
377777775 ; (C.1)
and at the steady state  
1

+ %¯
!
1

= RL and RCB =
1

: (C.2)
Let W1 = (RCB;t   1   Vt+1;t + %˜t+1) and W2 = (RL;t   RCB;t+1).
Approximation of Left-Hand Side (LHS)
Et
1
+1

Bt+1
 B  RCB;t   1   Vt+1;t + %˜t+1 =
Et
1
+1

Bt+1
 B W1 
Et
"
 B dBt+1+0:5bdBt+12+cW1+0:5cW12 dt+1+0:5(dt+1)2 B dBt+1cW1+B dBt+1dt+1 cW1dt+1#:
(C.3)
41Note that %˜t = %t  t+1. For analytical simplicity we look at deviations of %˜t. This do not alter the intuition of the
results.
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cW1 = 1
 
[RCB;t   1
 
[Vt+1;t + 
 
d%t+1; where   =  1

  1 + %¯
!
; and
cW1+0:5cW12 = 1  [RCB;t+0:5[RCB;t2+ %¯  hd%t+1+0:5(d%t+1)2i  1   [Vt+1;t+0:5 [Vt+1;t2:
(C.4)
Hence, LHS becomes
Et
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
 B dBt+1+0:5BdBt+12+ 1  [RCB;t+0:5[RCB;t2+ %¯  hd%t+1+0:5(d%t+1)2i
 dt+1+0:5(dt+1)2+B dBt+1dt+1  1   [Vt+1;t+0:5 [Vt+1;t2
 B dBt+1 1 [RCB;t  1  [Vt+1;t+ %¯  dt+1  1 [RCB;t  1  [Vt+1;t+ %  d%t+1dt+1
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
:
(C.5)
Approximation of Right-Hand Side (RHS)
Et
1
+1+2

Bt+2
 B (RL;t   RCB;t+1) =
Et
1
+1+2

Bt+2
 B W2 
Et
h
 B dBt+2+0:5bdBt+22+cW2+0:5cW22 dt+1+0:5(dt+1)2 dt+2+0:5(dt+2)2
 B dBt+2cW2+b dBt+2dt+1+B dBt+2dt+2 cW2dt+1 cW2dt+2+dt+2dt+1i: (C.6)
From the definition of W2
cW2 = 0BBBBBB@ 1 +   dRL;t   1  [RCB;t+1
1CCCCCCA where   =  1   1 + %¯
!
and
cW2 + 0:5 cW22 = 1 + %¯
 
dRL;t + 0:5 dRL;t2   1
 

[RCB;t+1 + 0:5

[RCB;t+1
2
: (C.7)
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le Hence, RHS becomesEt 8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:  B dBt+2+0:5BdBt+22+ 1 +%¯  dRL;t+0:5dRL;t2  1   [RCB;t+1 +0:5 [RCB;t+1 2 dt+1+0:5(dt+1)2 dt+2+0:5(dt+2)2 B dBt+20BBBB@ 1 +%¯  dRL;t  1  [RCB;t+11CCCCA+dt+2dt+1++B dBt+2dt+1+B dBt+2dt+2 0BBBB@ 1 +%¯  dRL;t  1  [RCB;t+11CCCCAdt+1 0BBBB@ 1 +%¯  dRL;t  1  [RCB;t+11CCCCAdt+2
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
: (C.8)
From the definition of term premium we have that tp = 0:5(RL;t  RCB;t+1  RCB;t + 1), hence42
btp+0:5(btp)2 1 +  dRL;t+0:5dRL;t2  1   [RCB;t+1 +0:5 [RCB;t+1 2  1  [RCB;t +0:5[RCB;t 2: (C.9)
We can now combine the LHS and RHS to get
Et
btp+0:5(btp)2 = Et"BdBt+2 dBt+1+0:5B dBt+22 dBt+12!+ %¯  d%t+1+0:5d%t+12+CovTerms+# (C.10)
where,
CovTerms =  B dBt+1 %¯  d%t+1 B dBt+1 1  ([RCB;t  [Vt+1;t)+B dBt+1dt+1
 
h
1
  ([RCB;t  [Vt+1;t)+   d%t+1idt+1+B dBt+20BBBB@ 1 +%¯  dRL;t  1  [RCB;t+1 dt+1 dt+21CCCCA
+
0BBBB@ 1 +%¯  dRL;t  1  [RCB;t+11CCCCA(dt+1+dt+2) dt+2dt+1; and (C.11)
 = +dt+2 0:5(dt+2)2  1   [Vt+1;t+0:5 [Vt+1;t2: (C.12)
Appendix D. Long-term Investment with 1Y maturity
If we assume long-term investments are done at period t but mature at t + 4 then XL;t becomes
XL;t =
LEt[qLt+4t+1t+2t+3t+4]
RL;t
  1: (D.1)
42Note that the approximated signed is also used here since the denominator should be

1

  1 + 

+    1 and not
  =

1

  1 + 

:
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3Et 2666664Bt+4 B(RL;t   Rt+3;CB)t+1t+2t+3t+4 3777775 = Et "Bt+1 B  Rt;CB   1   Vt+1;tt+1 + %t+1!# +
Et
"
Bt+2
 B
 
Rt+1;CB   1   Vt+2;t
t+1t+2
+ %t+2
!#
+
2Et
"
Bt+3
 B
 
Rt+2;CB   1   Vt+3;t
t+1t+2t+3
+ %t+3
!#
: (D.2)
Where
Bt = tr
E
t +
(Rt 4;L   1)
tt 1t 2t 3
XL;t 4 + (Rt 1;CB   1)(XS ;t 1   dt 1) 1
t
 %t(XL;t 1 + XL;t 2 + XL;t 3) + XL;t 1Vt;t 1
t
+
XL;t 2Vt;t 2
tt 1
+
XL;t 3Vt;t 3
tt 1t 2
; (D.3)
dt = XS ;t + XL;t +
XL;t 1
t
+
XL;t 2
tt 1
+
XL;t 3
tt 1t 2
+ zt; (D.4)
Vt+1;t =
n
t+1 ft+4   E[%t+1=(2) + %t+2=() + %t+3]
o
Rt+1;CBRt+2;CBRt+3;CB
  1; (D.5)
Vt+2;t =
n
t+2 ft+4   E[%t+1=(2) + %t+2=() + %t+3]
o
Rt+2;CBRt+3;CB
  1; and (D.6)
Vt+3;t =
n
t+3 ft+4   2E[%t+1=(2) + %t+2=() + %t+3]
o
Rt+3;CB
  1: (D.7)
We define the term premium (annual rate in percentage points) between long and short-term
rate as
tpt =
1
4
 
RL;t   Rt;CB   Rt+1;CB   Rt+2;CB   Rt+3;CB + 3 400: (D.8)
Finally, the good market clearing condition is
Yt = Ct + XS ;t + XL;t + %t(XL;t 1 + XL;t 2 + XL;t 3): (D.9)
Short-term asset purchase agreements
We assume banks can only repo the long-term asset that is about to mature.
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le Profits and deposits are given byBt = trEt + (Rt 4;L   1)tt 1t 2t 3XL;t 4 + (Rt 1;CB   1)(XS ;t 1   dt 1) 1t
 %t(XL;t 1 + XL;t 2 + XL;t 3) + t 1XL;t 4
tt 1t 2t 3
(RQE;t   1)   QE2 
2
t 1
+
XL;t 1Vt;t 1
t
+
XL;t 2Vt;t 2
tt 1
+
XL;t 3Vt;t 3
tt 1t 2
; and (D.10)
dt = XS ;t + XL;t +
XL;t 1
t
+
XL;t 2
tt 1
+
XL;t 3
tt 1t 2
+ zt   t XL;t 3
tt 1t 2
: (D.11)
Which implies
Bt+1
 B

(RCB;t RQE;t) XL;t 3t+1tt 1t 2  QEt

= 0: (D.12)
3Et
8><>:Bt+4 B [RL;t Rt+3;CB+t+3(Rt+3;CB RQE;t+3)]t+1t+2t+3t+4
9>=>; = EtBt+1 B  Rt;CB 1 Vt+1;tt+1 +%t+1+
Et

Bt+2
 B

Rt+1;CB 1 Vt+2;t
t+1t+2
+%t+2

+
2Et

Bt+3
 B

Rt+2;CB 1 Vt+3;t
t+1t+2t+3
+%t+3

: (D.13)
Long-term asset purchase agreements
We assume banks can sell the long-term asset with the longest maturity and buy back before
maturity.
Profits and deposits are given by
Dt = PtXS ;t + PtXL;t + Pt 1XL;t 1 + Pt 2XL;t 2 + Pt 3XL;t 3 + Zt
 tPt 1XL;t 1   t 1Pt 2XL;t 2   t 2Pt 3XL;t 3; and (D.14)
Bt = tr
E
t +
(Rt 4;L   1)
tt 1t 2t 3
XL;t 4 + (Rt 1;CB   1)(XS ;t 1   dt 1) 1
t
 %t(XL;t 1 + (1   t 1)XL;t 2 + (1   t 2)XL;t 3)
+
t 3XL;t 4
tt 1t 2t 3
3(RQE;t   1)   QE2 
2
t 3
+
XL;t 1Vt;t 1
t
+
(1   t 1)XL;t 2Vt;t 2
tt 1
+
(1   t 2)XL;t 3Vt;t 3
tt 1t 2
:
(D.15)
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3Et8><>:Bt+4 B [RL;t Rt+3;CB+t+1(Rt+3;CB 3RQE;t+1+2)]t+1t+2t+3t+4 9>=>; = EtBt+1 B  Rt;CB 1 Vt+1;tt+1 +%t+1
+Et

Bt+2
 B (1 t+1)

Rt+1;CB 1 Vt+2;t
t+1t+2
+%t+2

+2Et

Bt+3
 B (1 t+1)

Rt+2;CB 1 Vt+3;t
t+1t+2t+3
+%t+3

(D.16)
Bt+1
 B (RCB;t 1)XL;t 1
tt+1
+Bt+2
 B (RCB;t+1 1)XL;t 1
tt+1t+2
+Bt+3
 B

[RCB;t+2 1 3(RQE;t 1)] XL;t 1tt+1t+2t+3  QEt

=0: (D.17)
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